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Résumé de synthèse
iv
Ce mémoire traite de la portée sociale et psychologique de trois façons
différentes de comprendre l’identité humaine, soit “monologiquement,”
“collectivement,” et “dialogiquement.” Ces trois interprétations du concept de
l’identité sont dramatisées dans mon roman, Adam’s Peak, qui soulève les
limitations et les possibilités des trois façons de comprendre la genèse de
l’identité, et qui constitue le sujet de mon analyse littéraire.
Le premier chapitre du mémoire présente ces thèmes en termes
théoriques. Je soutiens que le concept monologique de l’identité pose en principe
une conscience de moi qui développe de manière autonome et qui provient du
for intérieur de l’individu. Le concept collectif du moi, par contre, est basé sur
l’idée que l’identité est determiné par son adhésion à un groupe particulier. Le
concept dialogique, finalement, prend pour acquis que l’identité est construite en
dialogue avec autrui et repose sur la contingence des relations sociales dans
lesquelles l’individu est impliqué. Chapitre deux du mémoire offre un résumé
concis d’Adarn’s Peak. Chapitre trois applique les concepts présentés dans le
premier chapitre à une analyse d’Adam ‘s Peak.
Tandis que mon premier chapitre critique le concept monologique et le
concept collectif de l’identité, et sanctionne le concept dialogique, mon analyse
d’Adain’s Peak examine la façon dont le roman complique la question. Il peut être
utile de concevoir l’identité en termes monologïques ou collectifs, le texte
suggère, mais ces termes, si on les accepte sans reconnaître le caractère
fondamentalement dialogique de l’existence humaine, peuvent être destructifs.
Mots clefs:
identité; individualisme; nationalisme; communautarisme; Sri Lanka; littérature
canadienne, Adam ‘s Peak
VAbstract
yIbis thesis is concemed wiffi the social and psychological implications of
three different conceptions of human identity, which I refer to by the terms
“monological,” “collective,” and “dialogical.” These conceptions are dramatized
in my novel, Adarn’s Peak, which foregrounds ffie contrasting limitations and
possibilities of the collective, the monological, and the dialogical conceptions of
the self, and wbich serves as the focus of my critical analysis.
Chapter One of the thesis ouflines the novel’s concems in theoretical
terms. The monological conception of identity, I argue, posits a sense of self that
is consftucted autonomously, from within the individual. The collective
conception of the self is based on the idea that identity is detrmined by one’s
membership in a particular group. The dialogical conception, finally, assumes
that identity is constructed in dialogue with significant others and is contingent
upon the web of social relations in which the individual is embedded. Chapter
Two consists of a short synopsis of Adam’s Peak. Chapter Three applies the
concepts I have outlined in Chapter One to an analysis of Adam’s Peak.
While my theoretical discussion criticizes the collective and the
monological conceptions of the self and endorses the dialogical conception, my
analysis of Adarn’s Peak investigates the text’s problemafizing of the issue. We
might usefully conceive of our identity in collective or monological terms, the
novel suggests, but those conceptions, if adopted without recognition of the
dialogically determined horizons against which we determine who we are, are
ultimately destructive.
Key words:
identity; individualism; nafionalism; communitarianism; Sri Lanka; Canadian
literature, Adam ‘s Peak
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1Introduction
2This study is concemed with ffie social and psychological implications of
three different conceptions of human identity, conceptions that are dramatized in
my unpublished novel, Adam’s Peak.1 Through its treatment of the relationships
of two Canadian families
— one originally from Sn Lanka, the other from
Scotiand
— Adam’s Peak foregrounds the confrasting limitations and possibilifies
of what I will cail the “collective,” the “monological,” and the “dialogical”
conceptions of the self. Taking this fichonal exploration of identity as the
foundafion of my project, I will first outline the novel’s concerns in theoretical
terms, then I will apply those terms to an analysis of relevant passages of the
novel. My theoretical discussion of the three conceptions of idenfity will explicitly
endorse the dialogical conception. This discussion will, however, engage in a
necessary “fidying up” of certain features of human existence. The chapter
analyzing the novel will argue that while the text of Adam ‘s Peak is most
sympathefic to the dialogical view of identity, it also demonsfrates that
theoretical abstractions about human identity easily lose their integrity in the
messiness of concrete existence.
Given the somewhat unconvenfional content of this study — a critical
analysis of my own fictional work — and the content of my novel itself, it will be
helpful here, I believe, if I briefly comment on certain topics that a reader might
expect to find in my discussion but that I will not in fact be addressing. The first
of these topics is the relafionship between the different parts of my thesis; the
second is my “subject position” and its relationship to the content of my novel.
As the author of the fiction I will be discussing, I clearly occupy an
unconventional cnfical position, which permits me, in theory, to treat the
An excerpt of Adarn’s Peak appears in issue 3.2 (FaIl 2004) of Blackbird: an
Online Journal ofLiterature and the Arts, published by Virginia Commonwealth
University (www.blackbird.vcu.edu). At the time of completion of this thesis, my agent,
Westwood Creative Artists, is seeking a publisher for the whole novel.
3different parts of my thesis as being intimately connected. But while the
relationship between my theorefical work, my fictional work, and my analytical
work is significant in terms of the ideas expressed in each, I do not intend to
address that relationship in itseÏf In other words, although I am, as author of the
ficfional work under considerafion, in a position to discuss the genesis and
evolution of the ideas in my novel, or to freat the primary text and the
commentary related to that text as interdependent works, I will not be doing
either of these things. Any discussion of “the writing process,” while potenfially
interesting, is not, I believe, relevant in the context of literary criticism. And
while I cannot, of course, pretend that I am two different people
— writer and
critic — or that my fiction and my theory are not closely connected to each other
and to the same world view, that connecfion is not, again, relevant to the aims of
this study.2 In short, I conceive of the three parts of my thesis
— theoretical
discussion, novel, and analysis
— as separate, ffiough related, expressions of an
important and useful set of ideas concerning idenfity.
A matter connected to my decision not to address writing process issues is
my decision not to deal in depffi with the similarly subjective topic of the
relafionship between my personal history and experiences and the cultural
content of Adam ‘s Peak. While I was certainly conscious, dunng the writing of my
novel, of the problem of cultural appropriation and of the potential for the text
to slip into what Graham Huggan calls an “exoficist production of otherness”
(13), neither those issues in themselves nor my own “qualifications” to write
about the cultures represented in Adam’s Peak are relevant to this discussion. The
matter of exoticizafion is indeed one of the important thematic concerns of the
2 The one comment I wiIl make on my writing process is that I did flot actively foster
the connection between theory and fiction during the writing of Adai,z ‘s Peak. I did flot
work on the two simuftaneously, and while my theoretical and an4lytical work necessarily
depend on the novel, I did flot alter the novel in response to ideas generated in the other
parts of my thesis.
4novel, but it is not the concern that I am choosing to focus on here. Regarding
the reiationship between my subject position and the cultural references of my
novel, T believe that any attempt on my part to situate myseif in relation to those
references wouid not 5e useful. I say this in part because interpretations of
ourselves are, like ail interpretations, contingent and do notffing to ground our
interpretations of the world. More importantly, I belïeve th to try to justify or
qualify my decision to write about cultures other than my own (whatever
“other” and “my own” might mean) through a description of my subject
position would be to deny my most important power as a writer of fiction
— the
power of imagination. It would also be to endorse a conception of identity that
this study criticizes, a conception that essentializes cultural experience and insists
on the ïncommensurability of cultural “micronarratives,” to use Jean-François
Lyotard’s term.3 Thus, while I acknowledge that literary texts can fail to
represent their real world subjects respectfully or plausibly, I also agree with
Edward Said’s attack on the notion that, for instance, “only women cari
understand feminine experience, only Jews can understand Jewish suffering,
only formerly colonial subjects can ùnderstand colonial experience”
(“Intellectuals” 55). It is possible that I have failed, in Adant’s Peak, to represent
my subjects effectively. But if that is the case, I do not believe that my failure is a
resuit of my own particular subject position.
Although the issue of cultural representation in itself is not central to this
discussion, it is necessary that I pursue the matter of cultural differences, in a
somewhat different vein, for I recognize that readers of this thesis may not be
familiar with the Sri Lankan context in which a significant portion of my novel is
set. T wiIl therefore tum now to a brief overview of the political and social
Lyotard’s most famous discussion of the untranslatability of micronarratives, or
“petits récits,” can be found in The Postmodern Condition: A Report ou Knowtedge
(trans. GeoffBennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota p, 1984).
5context of those portions of Adarn’s Peak that are set in Sn Lanka.4 My overview
will necessarily be a far from comprehensive examination of Sri Lanka’s
demographics and complex history of internai sfrife. What I offer here are those
pieces of contextual information which, in my view, are necessary to an
understanding of the issues that I address in this study.
The isiand of Sri Lanka is populated by what have corne to be treated as
several relatively distinct ethnic groups.5 I say that these groups have corne to be
treated as distinct, for, as Suvendrini Perera argues, Sn Lanka’s convenfional
ethnic categonzafion, far from being distinct or natural, fails to represent the
“multiple points of identification and difference between peoples” that
characterize the counfry’s population, and is “the product of very specific
historical and polifical processes” (14, emphasis original). Perera’s argument is an
important one, and I wiil retum to it later in this discussion. For now, given that
ethnic categories play such a significant role in Sri Lanka’s political life, I will
briefly describe those categories in conventional, albeit problematic, terms.
Members of Sri Lanka’s largest identified ethrilc group, the Sinhalese,
form a majority population in most areas of the island. They generaliy practice
Theravada Buddhism and speak Sinhala, the counfry’s officiai language. Sri
Lanka’s Tamil population is commonly described as consisting of two sub
‘ My overview draws on a variety of print sources and on information I have
collected over the course of research trips to Sri Lanka in 1996 and 1998. Most of the
information I cite here can be found in Lakshmanan Sabaratnam’s essay “Sri Lanka: The
Lion and the Tiger in the Ethnic Archipelago” (in Pierre L. van den Berghe’s State Violence
and EtÏinicity, 1990). Much of the information in this overview is conveyed, implicitly or
explicïtly, in the text of Adarn’s Peak.
As K.M. de Silva points out, the term ethnicity has “eluded very precise definïtion
despite the attempts of many scholars” (13). It is used, variously, to denote race, or shared
cultural tradition, or common origin by descent rather than by nationality (and here I use
“nationality” to mean political state). In the Sri Lankan context, the term “ethnic group”
seems generally to refer to a collection of people with a common language, religion, and set
of cultural practices, as weIl as certain identifiable physical characteristics.
6groups6 Sri Larika Tamils, who have lived in the north and east parts of the
island for centuries, and Tamils of Indian origin, who were brought to the island
as plantation workers and have remained in the plantation areas of the south
central highlands. Most of the Tamil population practices Saivite Hinduism and
speaks Tamil. 0f the remaining minorifies, who, together, make up about eight
percent of the island’s total population, I will mention only the Burghers, my
reason being that the central Si-i Lankan characters in Adam’s Peak belong to this
group. Burghers, “Christian products of Euro-Asïan miscegenation who occupy
smaiÏ pockets in urban areas” (Sabarahiam 188), generally speak English as a
home language.7 As a resuit of t}teir English literacy and European cuitural
origins, Burghers occupied a relatively advantageous position under the Brifish
mie of Ceylon. But in the wake of Sri Lanka’s independence, increasing numbers
of them emigrated, primarily to Australia, England, and Canada. The Burgher
family in Adam’s Peak, the Vantwests (originally Van Twest), moves from
Colombo to Montreal in 1970, for unusual reasons; Toronto would have been a
much more common choice at the lime.
The complicated and violent intemal conflict ffiat has plagued Sri Lanka
since the mid-1950s has involved ah Sri Lankans to some extent, although,
reduced to its principle players, it is a confrontation between political
representalives of the “Sinhalese majority” and of the “Sri Lanka Tamils.” After
independence, the perception among many who identified with the first of these
groups was that the Tamil minority — described in stereotypical terms by K.M.
de Siiva as “an achievement-oriented, indusfrious group” (12) — had, as
6 Perera points out that the Tamil population is further sub-divided into “Jaffna,’
‘Colombo’ and ‘Batticoloa’ Tamil” (14), and that ambiguities in each of the other ethnic
categories, too, have been translated into subdivisions.
The “European roots” of Burghers are generally British or Dutch; the “Asïan
roots” are either Sinhalese or Tamil.
7Lakshmanan Sabaraffiam explains, “benefïted a great deal under the Brifish,
being overrepresented in the administrative system and the professions” (204).
In 1956, a Sinhalese nationalist government came to power and began
immediately to pass legislafion intended to reverse these perceived benefits.
Since that time, in response to what Perera cails the “post-independence
chauvinism of the state,” which “recast the muffiplicity of Sri Lanka into a binary
struggie between essenfialised ‘Sinhala’ and ‘Tamil’ antagonists” (1 5),8 and to
increasing episodes of civilian, military and state violence directed against
Tamils,9 a Tamil separatist movement has gathered strength. This movement
comprises a variety of advocacy groups, the most well known being the
Liberafion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LITE), who employ guerrilla tactics and acts of
terror in their efforts to secure a sovereign Tamil state (Tamil Eelam), and who,
according to Sabaraffiam, enjoy “a sfill-extensive support” (213). The January
1996 bombing of Colombo’s Central Bank, which has been attributed to the
LITE, figures importantiy in Adam’s Peak.
The novel’s offier non-Canadian national context is Scotland. Because I am
assuming that this context will be more familiar to readers o this thesis, and
because Scotland’s history and polifics do not figure prominently in Adam’s Peak,
I am not including an overview of the Scoffish context. Ibis omission is not
intended to imply that I find the Scottish context (or the Canadian) any less
complicated or worthy of attention than the Sri Lankan.
8 In 1956, for example, the govemment passed the Language Act, making Sinhala
the officiai language of the country; in 1972, the year Ceylon severed political ties with
Britain and adopted the name Sri Lanka, the leaders of the new state passed an act requïring
Tamil students to achieve higher university entrance scores than Sinhalese students. K.M.
de Silva argues that S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike’s victory in 1956 “represented the rejection of
the concept of a Sri Lankan nationalism based on an acceptance of pluralism I. . .]“ (24).
In July 1983, following the deaths of several Sinhalese soldiers in an ambush,
mobs of Sinhaiese people in Colombo attacked Tamil homes and property, while the police
and military either ignored them or assisted in the attacks. As Sabaratnam points out, “the
supply ofTamil bouse lists indicated government complicity in the pogrom” (215).
$A final bnef word concerning ffie content and organization of ffie
following chapters is necessary here. Chapter One establishes l:he theoretical
foundations of ffie analysis I will undertake in Chapter Three. The focus of this
first chapter is the three conceptions of human identity that are at stake in
Adanz ‘s Peak. My discussion of these conceptions draws significantly on the ideas
of theorists of nafionalism, such as Michael Ignatieff, Michael Hardt and Antonio
Negri, and on the ideas of thinkers concemed with community, including
Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, and Seyla Benhabib. The chapter concludes with
a brief discussion concemîng the value of fiction, compared to theory, as an
expression of important ideas about the world. Chapter Two consists of a short
synopsis of Adam’s Peak. Chapter Three applies the concepts outlined in Chapter
One to a themafic analysis of the freatment of idenfity in Adam ‘s Peak.1° The
critical approach I take in Chapter Three is an eclecic one, aimed at highlighting
important features of the text — conftict, character, form
— and connecfing
those features thematically to the issue of idenfity.
For the purposes of thïs analysis, I refer to the manuscript of Adam ‘s Peak that is housed
in the English Department office of the University of Montreal.
9Chapter One
Theoretical Foundations
10
The main characters of Adam ‘s Peak are struggiing to construct meaningful
identities for themselves. In one way or anoffier, they have asked themselves the
question “Who am I?” and have arrived, inifially, at what Charles Taylor terms
“a radical uncertainty of where they stand” (Sources 27). Their identifies are, in
other words, in crisis. In its development and resolution of these crises, Adam ‘s
Peak dramafizes three different ways in which individuals might conceive of their
identity. The labels I vilI attach to these different conceptions of identity are
“collective,” “monological,” and “dialogical.” This chapter explains what I mean
by each term and outiines what I believe to 5e, on the one hand, the serious
limitations of the first two conceptions and, on the offier, the nch possibilifies
offered by the third. I conclude the chapter with some thoughts on the value of
literatnre as an expression of these limitations and possibilities. Before I embark
on my discussion of the three conceptions, however, it is first necessary to
provide a more global sense of what I mean by “identity.” Here, as elsewhere in
this discussion, I find Taylor’s ideas to be parficularly compelling.
Taylor connects the notion of idenfity, or selfhood, to morality
— not
merely the kind of morality that dictates how we should or should not conduct
ourselves in the world, but, rather, a broader morality, concemed with “what it
is good to be” (Sources 3). The ffiree conceptions of identity that I propose to
investigate can ah be seen as interpretafions of Taylor’s contention that
[t]o know who you are is to 5e oriented in moral space, a space in
which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth
doing and what not, what has meaning and importance for you
and what ïs trivial and secondary. (Sources 28)
This parficular understanding of idenfity has hvo crucial implications. First, the
mulfiplicity of “questions” that might arise in fi-te vast reaim of “moral space”
and require us to orient ourselves suggests that idenhty is, as Taylor writes,
11
“complex and many-tiered” (Sources 29). It is impossible, in short, to capture the
whole of one’s idenfity in a single label. Second, the idea of “orienting” oneseif
somewÏzere in a reaim of possibilifies
— the specific possibilifies that arise can
certainly vary over lime and from context to context — implies that idenfity is
relational. In decidïng what it is we value, who it is we are, we position ourselves
in relation to other people, other possibulities. Moreover, as I will discuss further
on, it is through our relafionships with other people that the various possibilities
available to us take on significance. In the moral space wifluin which the self is
constructed, then, that self “can neyer 5e described without reference to those
who surround it” (Sources 35).
Importantly, Taylor tends, somewhat problematically, to conceive of the
individual’s sense of who he or she is in positive terms. In hi’ atiaching of
identity to notions of “what it is good to be,” in bis description of idenfity as “the
background against which our tas tes and desires and opinions and aspirations
make sense” (‘Tolitics” 33-34, emphasis added), and in bis endorsement of the
daim that everyone “should be recognized for bis or lier unique idenfity”
(“Polifics 38, emphasis added), he suggests that people’s identifies are, generally,
positive, something to enjoy and protect. But, of course, it is entirely possible for
an individual to have a negative sense of self, to 5e self-loafiting even. Taylor’s
discussions of identity do not pay much attention to negative self-conceptions;
nevertheless, bis contention that identity is complex, relafional, and connected to
notions of the good does not preclude the possibility of such a self-concept
developing. As my novel implies, and as I wiIl argue in Chapter Three, a
negative sense of self, like a positive one, is necessarily comi..;lex and emerges
from ideas, established relationally, about what is valuable and worthwhile.
0f the three parficular conceptions of identity that I wish to discuss, two
— the collective and the monological
— connect identity to morality, in its broad
12
sense, but faiT to account for the implications of that connection. Certain
discourses of collective identity recognize, in a limited sense, the relational
character of identity11 but disregard its complexity. The discourse of liberal
individualism, on the other hand, acknowledges that idenfity is complex and
muffifaceted but tends to deny the importance of our relations to others in the
achieving of seif-definihon. Both of these discourses offer fictions of the self,
which, if accepted as realities, can have painful, even disasfrous, consequences.
The dialogical conception of identity, which I associate with ertain features of
communitarianism, succeeds, I believe, in more authentically represenhng
human experienc&2 by responding to both the complexity and the relational
character of human idenhty. The following discussion elaborates on these daims,
in terms that will facilitate my analysis of Adnin’s Peak.
I. The Fiction of Collective Identity
Modem societies can be infinitely divided into groups of one sort or
another. Religious affiliation, ethnicity, class, race, sexual orientation, and
countless other banners are ïnvoked as unifiers of particular segments of a wider
population. Imagining one’s identity as being partly constituted by membership
in a group, whose other members one may neyer meet, is not in itself dangerous
or undesirable. Quite the opposite, in fact. As Taylor points out, such collecfivifies
give their members a frame “within which they can detemiine where they stand
on questions of what is good, or worthwhile, or admirable, or of value” (Sources
“In his discussion of ethnic unrest in the Baikans, Michael Ignatieff argues, “A
Serb can’t define himself except in relation to Croats, and vice versa. They are brother
enemies, the one a tragic mirror of the other” (92).
2 Clearly, my terminology reveats my humanist tendencies. t believe that it is
possible, with caution, to speak of “human experience.” With regard to Taylor’s
descriptions of identity and morality, I would argue that they are loose and flexible enough
to apply to members of ail modem societies, or, at least, to those societies and cultures
represented in Adain ‘s Peak.
13
27). Collective identifies, moreover, provide a vehicle for the social and political
consolidation and mobilization of groups of people. Nations work because, as
Benedict Anderson famously explains, their members are able to imagine
themselves as being meaningfully connected to each other; oppression and
inequality are more effecfively combatted if victimized individuals idenfify with
each other and act collectively, for the betterment of the group. In short,
collective identifies are indispensable in modem society. The problem with
collective identifies emerges when individual identifies corne to be equated
enfirely with the collective. This denial of the complex, mulfifaceted self in favour
of a narrow, essenfialized conception of the self is not only a distorfion of “real
life,” but, when taken to an exti-eme, becomes a source of hatred and violence.
Given the concerns of Adam’s Peak, I will focus in this part of my
discussion on the kind of collective idenfity that draws together people of a
common ethnicity or cultural background, especially for the purpose of asserfing
national sovereignty. My arguments will pay particular attention to the
nafionalist rhetoric of the Liberafion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LITE). As my
introduction points out, the LTTE’s sovereignty project emerged in part as a
response to the biased policies of various Sinhalese nafionalist governments and
to increasing episodes of violence directed against Tamil people. My aim here is
flot to engage in the debate over the legitimacy of the LTTE’s grievances and
daims, but, rather, to examine and problemafize the organization’s implicit
conception of idenfity.
The LTTE’s vision statement — not significantly different in its emofional
content or rhetorical thrust from ffie nationalist agendas of many Sinhalese
dominated governments
— imposes on Sri Lanka’s Tamil people a collective
national idenfity that is narrow and essentialist:
The Tamil people of the island of Ceylon (now called Sri Lanka)
14
consfitute a distinct nation. They form a social entity, with their
own history, traditions, culture, language and traditionai
homeland. Ihe Tamil people cail their nation “Tamil Eelam.” [...]
Today, the LITE has evolved into a military and polifical
organization representing the hopes and aspirations of the Tamil
people.13
To retum briefly to the connection between identity and morality, this statement
can be understood to offer a vision of what it is good for a Sn Lankan lamil to
be — implicitly, someone interested and involved in the “history, traditions,
culture, [and] language” of the Tamil people and living in the “fraditional
homeland.” Such a vision clearly relies on the problematic assumption that the
Tamil people of Sri Lanka form what David Miller calis a “distinct, immutable
chunk of humanity” (240). The diversity of the three or so million individuals
who fit the label “Tamil people of the island of Ceylon” is homogenized in the
daim that these individuals comprise, in the singular, “a distinct nation” and “a
social entity,” with shared, measurable features — history, traditions, culture,
language, even aspirations and hopes — which constitute the identity of the
group. The passage suggests that these features, which are ail in some way
contingent,14 belong to the Tamil ethnic group, are essential to its existence, and
are acquired, as it were, by birth. In short, the LTTE’s vision statement implicitly
treats individual identity as being “embedded in that of the community in a very
strong sense,” such that individuals are encouraged to “identify themselves,
perhaps first and foremost, as members of it” (Gilbert 115). Again, though, it is
‘ This statement appears on the home page of the LTTE’s officiai web site,
www.eelam.com/tamil_eelam.htmL
W is worth noting, for example, that certain Tarnil traditions, such as the making of
piigrimages to Adam’s Peak (Sri Pada in Sinhala; Swangarrhanam in Tamil), are shared
by other Sri Lankan groups, and that the Tamil language is the native language of most
Muslims living in eastern Sri Lanka.
15
important to note that the LTTE are not alone, in the Sri Lankan context, in
essentializing idenfity in this way. Speaking more generally of this context,
Suvendrini Perera writes that “identification as ‘Burgher,’ ‘Sinhala,’ ‘Muslim’ or
‘Tarnil’ [has corne] to be assumed as central to — even constitutive of — our
identifies” (15). These identifications are misleading in a variety of ways.
One notable problem with the adopting of ethnicity, or any other single
collective identity, as a conception of the self is the assumption that identity does
not deveÏop. Rather, it is a birthright, an inheritance — or, at most, a limited set of
characterisfics passively acquired in a limïted social context. Gilbert hints at this
conception of identity when he writes that “if nations are thought of as peoples
with a shared ethnicity, then they are not being characterised in terms of [their
members’ social] relations, since ethnic group membership consists simply in
individual possession of the racial or cultural features required” (71).
Conceptions of identity such as that implied by the LTTE clearly rest on the idea
that possessing a particular set of racial and cultural features automafically fixes
one’s identity. Yet the notion of a fixed identity, circumscribed early in one’s life,
denies the influence on the self of ffiose social “relations” that Gilbert mentions
— relations that change and evolve over time, and do not necessarily bring
together people of the same collective identity. If we think of identity as being
negotiated in moral space, to use Taylor’s term, then these changing social
relations are, as I suggested earlier, crucial to my sense of what constitutes a
“good life” and, consequentÏy, to my sense of who I am. Identity is thus, I would
argue, a work in progress. Even if the social relations and circumstances that
occupy my “moral space” do not alter significantly from day to day or year to
year, the very possibility of change necessitates a conception of identity as being
fluid.
A more serious problem wiffi conceptions of idenfity based on collectively
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shared characterisbcs is the untenable suggestion that people are uncomplicated.
The LTTE vision statement would have us believe that there is an essential,
measurable “Tamilness,” which constitutes the individual Tainil person’s identity.
Even allowing that Tamil traditions and culture comprise a wide range of
possible ways of being, the essentialization of identity offered by the LTTE is stiil
inadequate. As a number of postcolonial theorists have been arguing for some
lime now, the existence of cultural “purity” has become a myth, if indeed it ever
existed. Rey Chow insists that “the idealized native is, literally, topographically,
nowhere” (49, emphasis original). Edward Said proposes that, “[pÏartly because of
empire, ail cultures are involved in one another; none is single and pure, ah are
hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic”
(Culture and Imperïalism xxv). Certainly in Si-i Lanka, a country in which a
preexisting mulfiplicity of cultures was colonized, in tum, by Portugal, the
Netheriands, and Britain, and in which we find what Perera refers to as
“complex, intertwined histories and enmeshed, interlocking identifies” (15), the
probabilily of an indivi dual developing a culturally homogeneous identity is
siim, to say the least.15
But the fiction of collective efimic idenfity goes beyond a denial of the
ways in which cultures have inftuenced each other; it also consists in a conception
of idenfity that arfificially foregrounds a pre-determined set of characterisfics and
fails to account for the realifies of a multitude of infinitely complex individuals
living their lives. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri characterize the problem,
I do flot wish to align myseif here with cultural hybridity theorists, such as Homi
Bhabha, who, as Pheng Cheah argues, misguidedly reject the importance of the given
cultural realities in which people exist and instead understand culture as “the reaim of
humanity’s freedom from the given” (292). Clearly, Sri Lankan Tamil culture exists in a
unique and observable way and is a crucial constituent of the identities of Sri Lankan Tamil
people. My argument is that this particutar “given culture,” to use Cbeah’s term, is flot as
uncomplicated and monolithic as the LTTE’s vision statement suggests.
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“the multiplicity and singularity of the multitude are negated in the sfraightjacket
of the identity and homogeneity of the people” (107). Michael Ignafieff crificizes
the fiction of nationalist identity polifics in similarly compeiling terms.
“Nationalism,” he writes, “does not simply ‘express’ a pre-existent idenfity: it
‘constitutes’ one. It divides/separates/reclassifies difference. It does so by
absftacting from reai life” (92).16
Ignatieff’s insightful analysis of the specific case of the brutal ethnie
tensions that have arisen between Serbs and Croats in the former Yugoslavia can
usefully be applied to the context of Sri Lanka. The questions he poses point to
the serious limitations and dangers of understanding identity in collective,
essenfialist terms:
If Hobbesian fear explains why neighbors tumed into enemies,
how do we explain the earlier step, how they begin to conceive of
their differences, which are always there, as being identities that
seal them off from everyone else around them? How do they
begin to think of themselves as Serbs, above ail else, and Croats,
above ail else? These are people who share a common life,
language, physical appearance, and a great deal of history. For
nearly fifty years, being a Serb or Croat took second place to being
Yugoslav; sometimes it took third or fourffi place, to being a
worker, or a mother, or any of the other identifies that consfitute
the multiple range of our belongings. Nafionalism is a fiction of
6 Iris Marion Young directs similar criticisms against the particular ideal of
community that she finds in certain feminist groups. She argues that “a desire for unity or
wholeness in discourse generates borders, dichotomies, and exclusions” and, further, that
“the desire for mutual identification in social relations generates exclusions in a similar
way” (301). Young’s use of the term “community” differs from my own, as will become
apparent further on in my discussion; however, I agree with her daim that an ideal of
community based on “mutual understanding and reciprocity f. . .] is similar to the desire
for identification that underlies racial and ethnie chauvinism” (311).
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identity, because it confradicts the multiple reaiity of belonging. Tt
insists on the primacy of one of these beiongings over ail the
others. (94)
In response to his own questions, Ignatieff posits that, in a worid where “global
integration of the economy and culture” (95) is reducing the observable
differences between groups of people, those differences that remain take on
added significance. The resuit, he argues, borrowing Freud’s term, is a
“narcissism of minor differences” (94), a “systematic overvaluation of the self”
(97), which ultimately breeds intolerance of offiers. But, to return to the above
passage, Ignatieff’s astute description of the particular conception of identity that
is at issue in the Balkans crisis is useful to my discussion, for a similar conception
is also present in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. In the years since independence
(achieved in 1948), Tamil and Sinhalese Sri Lankans have been encouraged in a
variety of ways to disregard the extensive areas of overlap in their day to day
existence, the “multiple points of identification [.. .] between peoples” (Perera
14), and to downplay social belongings that do not foreground their connection
to an ethnically-based collective. What is offered instead, by groups such as the
LTTE, is a conception of cultural differences as consfituting whole identifies,
which seal individuals off from those outside the prescribed collective.17
While collective identifies undeniably offer to the individual a form of
confidence and moral certitude, the potential dangers of understanding one’s
identity in this way are poignanily evident in today’s world, in conflicts which
demonstrate that identity is not a matter of purely theoretical interest. In the
Baikans, in the Middle East, in Sudan, in Sri Lanka, conceptions of individual
A counterpart of the LTTE and its nationalist rhetoric can be found in Sinhalese
nationalist organizations such as the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which has engaged
in systematic campaigns of violence against Tamils. Anti-Tamil violence was particularly
wïdespread and brutal during the riots ofJuly 1983, which resulted in extensive property
damage in the Colombo area and between 500 and 600 deaths.
19
identity are lied to people’s very existence. Collective, essentialized idenfities
have the potenfial to fuel intolerance and arrogance — what Ignatieff refers to as
“the ‘you just don’t understand’ aspects of identity polifics” (97)
— and serve, in
ffie most exfreme circumstances, to jusfify ffie killing of individuals whose
realities are necessarily far more complex than any collective identity can
suggest. As I pointed out earlier, collective belongings serve a number of crucial
funcions in modem society. There are particular contexts in which it is clearly
useful for an individual to idenfify him- or herself as, say, “woman” or “Muslim”
or “queer” or “Latvian.” Broaden the context to encompass the individual’s
whole life, however, and each of those collective identifications becomes a
stereotype, a fiction of identity.
II. The Fiction of the Unencumbered Self 18
The counterpart in modem society of ffie idea of collcJive identfty is,
arguably, the liberal individualist conception of a self that is constructed
independently of other people. In contrast wiffi ffie notion that identity is
something into which we are born and which we share with others “like us,” we
find in contemporary Western culture a powerful principle, rooted in late
eighteenth-century philosophy, dictating that idenfity — our sense of what it is
good to 5e — ïs something that each individual must figure out and consftuct for
him- or herseif — from the inside, as it were. Like the idea of collective idenfity,
however, this sense that the self cornes into being on its own fails to account for
the ways in which people determine what it is good to be, the ways they orient
ffiemselves in moral space. The “self-made” idenfity is, thus, another fiction.
In The Maïnise ofModernihj, Charles Taylor traces the history of this
8 take the term “unencumbered self’ from Michael Sandel’s essay “The
Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self,” to which I refer later on.
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conception of idenfity, which he connects to modem culture’s19 “ethic of
auffienficity” (25). The ethic of auffienticity — being frue to oneseif
— has its
source, Taylor writes, “in the eighteenth-century notion that human beings are
endowed with a moral sense, an intuitive feeling for what is right and wrong”
(26). This view originaily contrasted with a rival view, which stated ffiat
“knowing right and wrong was a matter of calculating consequences, in
particular those concemed with divine reward and punishment” (26). Taylor
finds important phiiosophical opponents to this latter view, and to ffie more
generai idea that the individual’s moral and personal choices shouid 5e extemaily
dictated, in Descartes, Locke, J.S. Miii, and, in particular, in Jean Jacques
Rousseau, who “frequently presents the issue of morality as that of our
foilowing a voice of nature within us” (27). Importantiy, Taylor points out that
the ethic of authenficity, the ideal of following a voice within, has acquired a
“crucial moral importance” of its own in modem culture (29). Understanding my
inner, authentic self and leading my life in accordance with that self are seen not
only as positive endeavours but as moral imperatives.
Just as it is neither faise nor destructive to think of identity as being partiy
determined by communal belongings, there is nothing inherently problematic in
conceiving of identity as a ldnd of “inner truth,” a positive expression of
individualism. In defence of modem individualism and the ethic of authenficity,
Taylor points out that we “iive in a world where people have a right to choose
for themselves their own pattern of life, to decide in conscience what convictions
to espouse, to determine the shape of their lives in a whoie host of ways that
their ancestors couldn’t control” (Malaise 2). It is not my intention here to critique
‘ I use the terms “modem culture” and “modemnity,” as Taylor does, to refer to
the culture that has emerged from Enlïghtenment philosophy and that can be located, largely
but flot exclusively, in Europe and North America. These terms, as I use them, are
descriptive, flot normative.
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or to delegitimize modernity’s focus on the rights and freedoms of the
individual. What I wish to challenge is the idea that the individual is able to, and
indeed should, discover and express his or her inner truth independently,
without any reference or obligation to the outside world. This idea is what I am
calling the monological conception of identity.
The monological conception of the self, which Taylor attacks as a debased
version of the ethic of authenhdty, is evident in contemporary modem culture.
A particularly sftiking example of this conception can be found in a successful
self-help book of the mid-seventies, Gail Sheehy’s Passages: Predictable Crises of
Aduit Lzfe: 20
You can’t take everything with you when you leave on the midiife
joumey. You are moving away. Away from insfitutional daims and
other people’s agenda. Away from external valuations and
accreditafions, in search of an muer validation. You are moving out
of roles and into the self. [.. .] No foreign power can direct our
joumey from now on. It is for each of us to find a course that is
valid by our own reckoning. And for each of us there is the
opportunity to emerge rebom, authentically unique [...].(364,
emphasis original)
Sheehy’s text cari be read as a set of guidelines for idenfity formation, for
arriving at a full and authentic realizafion of the self. What is crucial to the
realization of an authenfic idenfity, Sheehy suggests, is that the “joumey” to that
identity be made independently. Other people, societal institutions, and social
roles are freated as “foreign powers,” extemal to the self and, implicifly, hostile
to it. Sheehy’s insistence on the need to move “away” from these external forces
2f) Tayior also cites Sheehy in The Malaise ofModernit (44). His analysis focuses
on Sheehy’s treatment of relationships.
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implies ffiat identity can, and should, be formed and understood in isolation —
monologically. Her guidelines can 5e read as an endorsement of what Michael
Sandel terms “the unencumbered self, a self understood as prior to and
independent of purposes and ends,” a self that is effectively “beyond the reach”
of its own experiences, such that no role or commitment, no project “could be so
essential that tuming away from it would cail into question the person I am”
(86).
Like the LTTE’s vision statement, Sheehy’s guidelines for self realization
attach idenfity to morality, in the sense that they suggest how an individual
should go about determining “what it is good to be.” But lier central guiding
pnnciple
— independence — does flot correspond to the dialogical nature of
human social existence. As Taylor writes,
A self can neyer 5e described without reference to those who
surround it. [.. .1 My seif-definifion is understood as an answer to
the question Who I am. And this question finds its original sense in
the interchange of speakers. I define who I am by defining where I
speak from, in the family free, in social space, in the geography of
social statuses and functions, in my intimate relations to the ones I
love, and also crucially in the space of moral and spiritual
orientations within which my most important defining relations
are lived out. (Sources 35)
In other words, while it is enfirely feasible for me to say that I am going to
disregard the values, desires, and so forth of my significant others, or of society
at large, I will still 5e defining myself in relation to those others. What I cannot
do, barring some extraordinary act of physical and psycholo;ical isolation, is
exfract myself from the web of relations in which I am embedded as a social
being. I can reject certain roles, but I cannot, as Gail Sheehy would have me do,
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move “out of roles and into the self.” For roles, which situate me in relation to
other people, are constitutive of that self.
Both Sandel and Taylor make the argument, with which I agree, that the
unencumbered self is, like the ideal of the essentialized collective identity, a
fiction. It is a fiction with the potential to impart a powerful sense of freedom —
from painful relafionships, from oppressive social obligations
— but this sense of
freedom cornes at a cost. For denying altogether the constitutive nature of one’s
relationships has negative consequences, consequences that are as damaging,
potenfially, as painful relationships and oppressive social obligations.
Taylor makes a convincing connection between the denial of the identity
forming potential of relafionships and what he terms the chronic “malaise” of
modem culture. Echoing Ignatieff’s crificisms of ethnic identity polihcs, Taylor
connects this denial to a “culture of narcissism,’ the spread of an outiook that
makes self-fulfilrnent the major value in life and that seems to recognize few
extemal moral demands or serious commitments to others”2 (Malaise 55). He
sees the narcissism of radical indivïdualism as a primary source of dissatisfaction
and unhappiness
— malaise
— in the modem world. The “dark side of
individualism,” he writes, “is a cenfring on the self, which both flattens and
narrows our lives, makes them poorer in meaning, and less concemed with
others or society” (Malaise 4). In his summary of Taylor’s take on the modem
identity crisis, Robert Scott Stewart writes that “persons situated in the
conternporary world have lost the capacity to arficulate who and what they are”
(49). The picture Stewart paints is grim, yet modem culture’s investment in
individualism is so sfrong that we often fail to recognÏze the costs of this
enormously influential ethic. We persist, as Taylor suggests, in attaching to
21 Taylor takes the expression “culture of narcissism” from Christopher Lasch’s
book The Culture ofNarcissism : American bfe in an Age oJDiminishing Expectations
(New York: Warner Books, 1979).
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individual freedom and the pursuit of authenticity a powerful moral force —
more powerful, arguably, than ïs attached to relationships and their inherent
obligations, or to the well-being of society as a whole. The Shakespearean dictum
“To thine own self 5e frue” strikes us as noble advice, based on a worthy ideal;
however, ultimately, modem society’s apparent need for books such as Sheehy’s
(which works to convince its reader that breaking free of relationships is a good
thing), or, in a different vein, of books aimed at helping people to create
relationships, traditions, and other forms of shared meaning in their lives,
suggests that the modem implications of that ideal are flot as deddedly
untroubled as we would like them to be. The “flattening” and impoverishment
of which Taylor speaks are, it seems, very real.
III. The Dialogïcal Nature of Human Identity
In outlining what I believe to 5e the central problems of conceiving of
idenfity in either collective or monological terms, I have necessarily said quite a
bit about the assumpfions behind my preferred conception of idenfity, the
dialogical conception. The most important of these assumplions is, broadly
speaking, that human idenlity is inftmnsically lied to human relationships. To
understand the implications of conceiving of identity in this way, it is useful to
consider ffie ideas of communitarian philosophers such as Taylor and Sandel.
Though there is debate and disagreement among them, most communitarians
share the understanding that “indïviduals are constituted by the community of
which they are a part,” that “the social aftachments which determine the self are
not necessarily chosen ones” (Avineri and de-Shalit 3), and that it is benefiual for
the self to 5e “constituted by its communal lies” (Avineri and de-Shalit 7).
Before I say more about the “communitarian” conception of identity, it is
necessary first to address the possible implications of “community,” for the term,
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as it is sometimes used, invites reasonable criticisms. The concept of community
is, as Markate Daly points out, “notoriously ambiguous” (xv) and can be
attached to a broad range of social groupings, including ffiose with very narrow,
exclusionary conceptions of idenfity (Daly mentions Flifler’s Nazis as one
extreme example of such a “cornmunity”). Marilyn Friedman, among others,
crffidzes communitarianism on the grounds that it “pays insufficient regard to
the illegitimate daims which communifies make on their members, linked, for
example, to hierarchies of domination and subordination [.. .]“ (307). Yet
Friedman’s cribcisms, while applicable to a certain conception of comrnunity as
being inherently chauvinistic, homogeneous and conservafive, do not apply to
ail conceptions of communily. Seyla Benhabib’s ffieory of community, for
instance, makes a distinction between what she cails “integrationist” community
— the kind that Friedman attacks — and “partidpafionist” commumty. Benhabib
rejects the first as being incompatible with the pluralist and autonomist values of
modem societies; she endorses the second as a kind of communal belonging
grounded in the “political agency and efficacy” (77) of ail its members. But while
the participationist model of communal belonging makes sense as a social ideal,
and while Benhabib points out that “a vibrant, parficipatory life can become
central to the formation and flourishing of one’s self-identity” (81), the model
does not focus on the lives of individuals, as individuats (rather than as abstract
members of society), and thus does not translate into a useful tool for
understanding just how it is that self-idenfity cornes to be formed.
For the purposes of this discussion, I would like to suggest that
“cornmunity” can be thought of in terms of what Taylor calis the “webs of
interlocution” (Sources 36) in which individuals exist. In other words, I can think
of “my community” as comprising the people with whom I share regular,
meaningful interactions and who, through those interactions, contribute to my
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sense of who I am in the world. These significant offiers need not be people wiffi
whom I get along, nor, as mentioned above, are they necessarily people I have
chosen to have in my life. The neighbour wiffi whom I have tense conversations
about television volume and the homeless woman I see every day and
sometimes give money to are part of my community, in the sense that my
interactions with these people help to orient me in moral space.
I have suggested at various points in this discussion that identity
— one’s
orientation in moral space — is constituted through relationships wiffi other
people. But more needs to be said about the nature of that process, about the
fundamentally dialogical character of human self-definifion. How does it work?
For an answer, it is useful first to consider Taylor’s examination of the
“languages” of seif-definifion:
We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves,
and hence defining an identity, through our acquisition of fich
human languages of expression. [. . .] I want to take “language” in
a broad sense, covering not only the words we speak but also
other modes of expression whereby we define ourselves, including
the “languages” of art, of gesture, of love, and the like. But we are
inducted into these in exchange wiffi offiers. No one acquires the
languages needed for seif-definition on their own. We are
introduced to them through exchanges with others who matter to
us — what George Herbert Mead called “significant others.” The
genesis of the human mmd is in this sense not “monological,” not
something each accomplishes on bis or her own, but dialogical.
(Malaise 33)
Taylor goes on to say, importanfly, that it isn’t simply the genesis of our identity,
sometime in childhood, that is dialogical, as many people caught up in the ideal
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of the monological self want to insist. Rather, “the making and sustaining of our
identity,” he writes, “remains dialogical throughout our lives” (Malaise 35). Ifils
idea echoes Sandel’s response to the question of whether or not human beings
are capable of understanding themselves independently of their social
attachments. We cannot, Sandel maintains,
at least flot without cost to those loyalties and convictions whose
moral force consists partiy in the fact that living by them is
inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons
we are
— as members of this family or community or nation or
people, as bearers of that history, as citizens of this republic. (90)
Sandel’s comments challenge not only the idea that the self can be understood
monologically but also the notion that the self is ffie product of a limited set of
relafionships, within a parficular collective. As his comments reveal, the
“memberships” of any one individual are many and vaned, and each of those
belongings contributes to the individual’s sense of who he or she is. Against
Seyla Benhabïb’s crificisms of Sandel’s and Taylor’s conceptinns of the self, I
would argue that neither of these philosophers denies, as Benhabib daims, “the
right of the self to distance itself from social roles” (73) or the modem
individual’s “achievement of being able to cnhcize, challenge and question the
content of these constitutive identifies” (74). Rather, what Sandel and Taylor are
arguing is that we cannot ex tract ourselves from the fundamental condition of
being constiftited by social connections of one sort or another.
In my examination of the “collective” and “monological” conceptions of
the self, I have devoted some attention to the implications — primarily negative
— of each conception. But what of the dialogical self? What are the implications
of understanding idenfity as being consfituted by our relationships wiffi others?
While theorists such as Marilyn Friedman and Iris Marion Young point to the
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limitations of afraching one’s identity to a community of relationships, where
“community” is understood to have potenfially sinister undertones, I would like
to suggest that the implications of the “communitarian” conception of the self, as
I have described it above, are positive. For although this conception ties my
identity to other people, and thus, in a certain sense, constrains me, it is those ties
themselves that give meaning to OEte choices I make as an individual
— choices
that express my identity.
As Taylor explains, the choices we make as individuals take on
significance against a “background of intelligibility,” a “horizon” (Malaise 37),
which is established socially. From the endless range of ways in which I might
choose to define myseif, only certain of those ways will strike me as worthy of
recognition. Compare, for instance, the fact that I am exactly the same height as
some tree in my back yard (I take this example from Taylor) with the fact that I
have had four short stories published in literary joumals. The first of these has
no relevance to my identity; the second is quite significant to it, because
publication in literary joumals is something that has, through my interactions
with significant others, acquired some importance in my life. In other words, the
characteristics by which I choose to identify myseif seem worthwhile to me, have
meaning, because they have meaning for other people. The meaning for my
significant others might be a negative one — think of the teenager who gets her
tongue pierced in defiance of her parents’ wishes — but it is, nevertheless,
meaning, dialogically established.
This example of the adolescent consfrucfing her identity in defiance of
significant others is an important one, for it demonstrates that the dialogical
conception of identity does not deny the individual’s potenfial to intervene in the
terms of his or her relationships. The fact that my ïdentity depends on my
relafionships with others does not, in other words, mean that I have no power as
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an individual in determining wlio or what I am going to be. b take anoffier
example, I might choose to break off contact wiffi my significant others and to
focus ail my attention on my wrffing career. The “Sheehy school” of
individualism would have me believe that I am moving away from “external
valuations and accreditations” and determining entirely from wifliln what I
should do with my life. But such an assessment neglects the crucial role that my
social relationships have played in the establishing of wrffing as something I
deem to be a worthwhule activity. My choice to write fuil-tirne may involve a
distancing from significant others, but that choice, and the seif-definition I would
derive from it, would take on significance, boffi positive and negative, against a
horizon of meaning that lias been consfructed in dialogue, possibly with those
same significant others. I mention “negative” significarice here, for, as
individualists such as Sheehy recognize, distancing oneseif from relationships
and commitments is not easy. But whereas the radical individualist might insist
that any doubts or negative self-perceptions that I experience as a resuit of
having distanced myself from significant offiers are unwarranted
— I am simply
fulfilling a moral obligation to be true to myseif, such a person might say
— the
dialogïcal conception of the self acknowledges the validity of such feelings.
Relationships and commitments are central to who I am, this conception
recognizes. I am free to alter my relafionships, but I cannot do so without
changing my sense of who I am.
IV. From Theory to Fiction
To this point in my discussion, I have perhaps given the impression that I
am suspicious of the imaginary, the fictionai. After ail, I crfficize the collective and
monological conceptions of the self in part because they seem to deny something
“real” about human identity. My endorsement of the dialogical conception of the
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self, on the other hand, is parfly based on what I see as its correspondence to that
same “reality.” But it is not the fictiveness of the first two conceptions that
troubles me — arguably, any attempt to understand and define human identity,
even dialogically, involves the construction of something, a “self,” that does not
exist independenfly of the imagination. No, the problem with certain collective
and monological conceptions of identity is, as I have suggested above, the ways
in which those particular fictions of identity tend to influence people’s behaviour
and relafionships in the “real world.” It is against such phenomena as “ethnic
cleansing” and chronic malaise that I foreground the connection between the
dialogical conception of the self and the everyday realities of human social
existence. Paradoxically, however, I believe that the most effective way of
expressing the ideas I have just been discussing in theoretical terms is through
literature.
My understanding of the relationship between “theory” and “literature”
is crucial to the content and approach of this study and therefore merits some
attention. First, although the distinction behveen the writings of such disciplines
as philosophy or sociology and the kind of writing that generally fails under the
category of “literature” is arbitrary and can certainly be challenged7 I am
assuming here that the fictional work I will be analyzing later in this study is
significantly different from the theoretical discussion of identity that I have just
completed (I will say more about these differences below). At ffie same time, I
want to insist on an important similarity between these two parts of my thesis —
between theory and literature, in other words. In contrast with the daims of
literary crifics, from New Critics to post-structuralists, who challenge the notion
22 In his introduction to Literary Theon’, Teriy Eagleton discusses in detail the
problems of concisely and objectively defining what is meant by ‘iierature.”
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that literary texts assert ideas about the world,23 this study clearly rests on that
notion. I belïeve that literary texts and criticism that deny literature’s capacity to
express important ideas about the world
— certain brands of formalist criticism,
for instance, or, more recently, fiction tliat professes to be entirely “self
reflexive”24
— are ultimately seif-deceptive and uninteresting. Both the text of
Adnm’s Peak and my analysis of the text assume that fiction has as much to say
about the world as do philosophy, sociology, psychology and so forth, and that
the ideas that literature expresses should be the primary focus of the literary
crific.
But to retum to my earlier daim, a significant difference between texts I
am calling literature and texts I am calling theory is that the wo express their
ideas about the world in different languages, different forms. Without
embarking on what would necessarily be a sfrained comparison of the features
of these socially-consftucted categories, I would nonetheless like to argue that
the language and foi-m of “literature” express certain ideas more compellingly
than do the language and form of “theory.” For whereas philosophy,
psychology, and the like seek to describe and comment “objectively” on realities
from which they are implicitly (if not actually) distanced, literary texts — novels,
stories, even poems — venture not merely to describe and comment on those
In Poetic Statement and Critical Dogma, Gerald Graff examines arguments made
against the “propositional” view of literature and against the “referentiality” of fiction.
Graff shows how these arguments fail, and shows how the very theoists who make them
demonstrate in their own criticism a belief that literary works express ideas. His work deals
specïfically with poetry, but, as lie writes, “the thesis has obvious implications with respect
to literary works in general” (xvi).
24 Graff points to William Gass’s Wittie Masters’ Lonesome Wtfe as a
characteristic example of literature that denies its referentiality. Graff explains that in this
novel “the reader is told explicitly that the words lie reads are pure words (or pure
concepts) and are not to be taken as referring to anything outside themselves” (ix).
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realities but to re-create them.25 I use the term “re-create” not to make a case for
the existence of a potential one-to-one correspondence between world and text,
but rather to suggest that literary texts participate more acfively and explicitly in
the world to which they refer than do theoretical texts. As Charles Newman
argues in The Post-Modern Aura, his analysis of the role of fiction in late
twentieth-century Western culture, “fiction remains an unequaled medium for
fusing the imaginative and analytical faculties” (53). Fiction, ind other “literary”
genres are, in a sense, the genres of the pragmafist, who rejects abstract
conceptual rigidilies in favour of flexibility in practice26
— genres that generate an
infimacy and a complexity beyond the scope of “pure” theory’s language and
form.
To better illustrate this difference, it is useful to consider how the subject
of idenfity formation might be more compellingly addressed in literature than in
theory. Obviously, as the content of this chapter reveals, I believe that theoretical
language is useful
— even necessary
— for the articulation of certain ïdeas about
human idenfity. Philosophical theories about such matters as selfhood and
relafionships provide tools for discussing and, in a necessarily abstract sense,
understanding what is experienced “out in the world.” The kind of
understanding that literature offers, however, is more immediate; it is, in a way
that theory is not, of that world. Peter Esterhazy makes a forceful case for
literature’s power to express ideas about human identity:
Is not literature meant to speak of our being a thousand different
As Graif suggests, even literaiy works that daim flot to refer to anything outside
themselves engage in a kind of re-creation of external rea!ity. Graff’s analysis of Gass’s
short novel goes on to say, “One does flot need to read far in this novella to see that it
offers a number of assertions about the world in the very process ofjustifying its avoidance
of assertions” (ix).
26 Richard Rorty is perhaps the best known contemporary proponent of this version
of pragmatism, which is sometimes called subjective pragmatism or pragmatism of the left.
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kinds of things, at fimes even creafing this diversity? If literature
gives up this purpose, this duty, it renounces ail daim to legifimacy.
I am Hungarian. I am Siovene. I am Serbian. You do not need
literature for sentences like that. A bureaucrat will do, and a rubber
stamp. A border guard. An army. (125)
In this attack on essenfialized identifies, Esterhazy reveals both the possibilities of
literature and, implicffly, the limitations of theory in the treatment of the issue of
identity. Literature, he suggests, succeeds in expressing the complexifies and
nuances of idenfity, the “thousand different kinds of things” that make up the
self. Literature’s connection to human experience is so powerful, moreover, that
it even confributes to the complexity of the reader’s idenfity. Though the only
“non-literary” text that Esterhazy mentions here is the kind of bureaucratic
stamp that one might find in a passport, that stamp evokes a range of textual
forms — including, arguably, theoretical texts — that either fail to or have no
responsibulity to represent the complexifies of the world. In theorefical texts, as in
a passport, idenhty can 5e reduced, fidied up, made to fit a parficular model.
Literature, if it honours its “duty” to represent the diversity of human existence,
cannot help but express the confingencies and complications of the self.27
0f course, the project of represenfing, or “re-creafing,” the world in
literature does not, as I suggested above, require that literature sfrive for an
ulfimately unattainable correspondence between the literary text and the world
27 This idea is related 10 Sartre’s famous daim that it is impossible “to write a good
novel in praise of anti-Semitism” (5$). But whereas Esterhazy writs of literature’s “duty”
to the representation of human diversity, Sartre insists that the writer has a duty to recognize
the freedom of ail people.
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outside the text.28 Such a correspondence is undermined not only by the
noncoincidence of signffied and signifier, to use the Saussunan terms, but also by
the fact that, as Fredric Jameson points out, readers apprehend texts not as
things-in-themselves but, rather, through “sedimented layers of previous
interpretations” and through “sedimented reading habits” (9). In short, literary
texts “in-themselves” are distanced both from the world they represent and
from ffieir readers.
Yet these gaps arguably confribute to literature’s power to express the
complexity of the world. We might understand this feature of literary texts by
way of a spatial metaphor applied to two different reading scenarios. In the first
scenario, I am reading a theoretical text such as Charles Taylor’s Sources of the
Self As I read, I can think of myself as being, in a certain sense, outside of the
material world, in a place of sfreamlined and simplified (though not simple)
abstractions, which I must then apply to my concrete experiences in the world. In
the second scenario, I am reading a short story by Alice Munro. Here I can
imagine myseif as occupying a tighter, in-behveen space — between the world
of the text and the extra-textual world in which I live the rest of my life. I sense
that the former is striving on some level to coincide wiffi the latter, to overlap it.
This perpetual striving, but neyer altogether reaching, creates tensions in the
space that I occupy as reader — “frictions,” perhaps, which continually remind
me that the complexity of human existence exceeds the mimetic range of
narrative. In terms of their respective capacifies to help me understand human
identity, then, Taylor’s book gives me certain tools to apply to my life “outside
the text,” while Munro’s story, through its implicit striving to create complex
28 am assuming here, contrary to Jacques Derrida’s famous assertion, that there is
an “hors-texte,” an oppositÏon between the content of a literaiy work and the world outside
that work. For the purposes of this study, I do not accept Derrida’s daim that reading
“cannot legitimately transgress the text toward something other than ït, toward a referent”(158).
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human identifies, pushes me up against that outside world and cails attention to
ffie infinitely complicated selves that inhabit it.
I have argued in this chapter that identity is not only complicated but also
is developed and sustained in dialogue. The formai features of literary texts
make them excepfionally well-suited to convey the dialogical nature of human
existence. This power of literature, parficularly novels, is a central concem of
Mikhail Bakhtin’s Tue Dialogic Imagination. Bakhfin’s work, perhaps more than
any other theorist’s, offers an invaluable set of crifical tools for examining the
connection between literary form and questions of idenfity formation.
Just as human identity can be understood in monological or collective
terms, for Bakhtin, so too can ianguage and text be understood —
problemahcaily, he argues — in such terms. Bakhfin is crifical of philosophical
and stylisfic theories that postulate, on the one hand, “a simple and unmediated
relation of [the] speaker to his unitary and singular ‘own’ language,” and, on the
other, “a simple realizafion of this ianguage in the monologic utterance of the
individual” (269). Such theories of language and praxis as being “unmediated,”
“monologic” and “individual” parallel t±te monological conception of hurnan
identity that I addressed in the first part of this chapter. These theories aiso,
significanily, are connected to the collective conception of the self. Bakhfin argues
that the ideal of unitary language “gives expression to forces working toward
concrete verbal and ideological unification and cenfralizafion” (271). The forces of
“unification and cenfralizafion” that he identifies in European sociopolitical
history29 are, in important ways, comparable to the forces of collectivization that
I have attributed to present-day nafionalisms such as that of the LTTE. As
29The particular forces of ideologïcal unification and centralïzatïon to which Bakhtin
ïs referring are, of course, connected to the growth of capitalism. As a Marxist, Bakhtin is
therefore critical flot oniy of the conception of language that the forces imply but also of the
political and economic objectives of those forces.
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Bakhbn suggests, the idea of a unitary language helps to accomplish “the task of
cultural, national and polifical cenfralization” (273). The proIem with this idea is,
again according to Bakhfin, that “unitary language” is not a reality, but an ïdeal
that is “posited” (270)
— a fiction, in offier words. The reaiity of language, he
argues, is that ail discourse, “in each and every of its factors, from the sound
image to the furthest reaches of abstract meaning” is dialogic (259).
A full exploration of what Bakhhn means when he insists that ail discourse
is dialogic is beyond the scope of this discussion. For the purposes of my
argument, however, it is useful to consider certain of his daims about discourse
in the novel. The formai features of the novel, Bakhtin argues, give that genre,
more so than others, a disfinctively diaiogic character:
Authoriai speech, the speeches of narrators, inserted genres, the
speech of characters are mereiy those fundamental compositional
unifies with whose help heteroglossia [raznorecie] can enter the
novel; each of them permits a muifiplicity of social voices and a
wide variety of their iinks and interreiationships (aiways more or
less dialogized). These distinctive iinks and interreiafionships
between utterances and ianguages, this movement of the theme
through different ianguages and speech types, its dispersion into
the rivulets and dropiets of social heterogiossia, its dialogizafion —
this is the basic disfinguishing feature of the stylistics of the novel.
(263)
Ciearly, the kind of “mulfiplicity of social voices” and “dialogizafion” of theme
(throughout the various strata and subdivisions of society) to which Bakhtin is
referring here are more characteristic of some noveis than of others. Bakhfin
takes many of bis textual exampies from “sweeping” nineteenth-century Engiish
and Russian novels, which give voice to an often extraordinary range of people.
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Nonetheless, Bakhtin’s daims about the novel, especially when considered in
light of bis daims about the diaiogïcity of ail language, can usefully 5e applied to
a broad range of fictional narratives, as a means of investigafing prose ficfion’s
potential to convey the dialogic nature of human social existence and idenfity
formation.
I will retum to Bakhtin’s ideas later on, in my analysis of my own novel.
In anticipation of that discussion, however, it is necessary to comment briefly on
the complicated relationship between Bakhtin’s ideas and the traditions of
literary modernism, in which Adarn’s Penk parficipates. As Stiicy Burton daims in
her comprehensive discussion of the relafionship between Bakhtin and
modemism, “Bakhfin’s theories have proved popular among critics of modernist
and postmodernist literatures” (520), and yet modemist tendencies to “stylize
heteroglossia into high art, and thus to refashion a gap between life and art,
seldom engage [Bakhtin] or, it seems, command bis respect” (534)•30 Read in
Bakhtinian terms, Burton argues, “much modemist wrffing turns out to 5e
surprisingly monologic, given to highlighting the authority of the writer far
more than dialogue does” (527). It is important to note here that the tensions
Burton describes derive from a relatively narrow interpretafion of a limited set
of high modemist works. Arguably, ffiere is much in modemist literature,
conceived of more broadly, that is strikingly compatible both with Bakhfin’s
theones and with the idea that human identity is formed dia’ ogically. Two
formai features through which modernist texts, more than their predecessors,
function dialogically are point of view shifts and temporal shifts (both of which
are features of Adam’s Peak). Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. DaÏïozvny, to take one notable
Burton acknowledges a number of possible causes for Bakhtin’s relative
inattention to rnodernism, including the dangerous political climate in which he wrote the
essays in The Diatogic Imagination. Ultimately, though, she finds the “critical reasons for
this aporia in his work” (521) more intriguing and compelling than the circumstantial ones.
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example, moves in and out of the consciousnesses of a group of related
characters in such a way that the narrative becomes increasingly polyphonic, and
each character’s idenfity cornes to be constructed through that character’s
relafionships with other characters. The novel’s temporal weave of past and
present further confributes to its dialogism by rendering individual characters
“mufflvoiced.” While it is possible to argue that Mrs. Daïtoway “stylizes
heteroglossia into high art” or “highlights the authority of the author,” an
equally compelling case can be made for this text’s, and other modemist texts’,
dialogical qualifies. These are [Fie qualifies that invite a Bakhfinian interpretafion
and that ultimately offer powerful explorations — more powerful, in a sense,
than those of theorefical texts, or of the sweeping realist novels that Bakhtin
favours — of the dialogical manner in which human beïngs corne to understand
thernselves and others as seÏves.
In a variety of ways, Adam’s Peak aftempts to exploit the possibilifies of
literature, specifically of [Fie novel genre, in its freatment of identity. Through
character development, plot, and form, the text sfrives to dramafize both the
complexity of idenfity formation — the “thousand different kinds of things” that
consfitute the self — and its dialogical nature. While I arn flot yet certain whether
or not these atternpts have succeeded — a “successful” novel, for me, is one that
readers find moving (as opposed to, say, clever) — I am confident that the text of
Actant ‘s Peak expresses a nurnber of important and complex ideas concerning
idenfity.
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Chapter Two
Synopsis of Adam’s Peak
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On a stifling August day, six-year-old Clare Fraser and seven-year-old
Rudy Vantwest make eye contact from opposite sides of their suburban
Monfreal street. For a moment ffiey are connected, then each turns away
—
Clare to the garden sprinkler, Rudy to the excitement of his baby brotlier’s
impending birffi. Twenty-five years 1 ater, they and theïr families have had
scarcely more contact. While there are cultural differences separating them —
the Vantwests are from Sri Lanka, the Frasers from Scotiand
— the seemingly
insurmountable barner between the two homes has far more to do with the
famïlies’ idiosyncrasies and ftoubled pasts than wiffi simple xenophobia. But
over a few tumultuous months in 1996, Clare and Rudy, now continents apart,
are thrustby accident and choice into identity crises, or, rather, a long-delayed
coming of age, which connect them and their families profoundly.
Clare Fraser is a jazz pianist, vhose crippling social awkwardness makes
intimate relafionships impossible and threatens her very sanity. Since the deatli
of her father, Alastair, wliom she both resembles and resents, she bas lived with
her mother. Her social life ïs almost nonexistent, and most of her
“conversations” are imagined. Desperate for a change, but paralyzed by fear
and indecision, she languishes in her interior world until the Good Friday
moming that Adam Vantwest, cleaning his motorcycle in the driveway, invites
her to go for a ride. Clare accepts, and botli tlie ride itself and the friendship that
it sparks reveal to lier possibilities, ways of being, that she lias neyer imagined.
But just as her new sense of self is beginning to blossom — starting with the
unsettiing discovery of her sexuality — she leams tliat Adam lias crashed his
motorcycle and is in a coma. Despite lier awkwardness, Clare feels compelled to
speak to Adam’s family, and, for the first lime ever, she and lier motlier pay a
visit to the house across tlie street. Over the course of lier meetings with the
troubled Mr. Vantwest and his sister, Clare’s impulse to change lier life becomes
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increasingly urgent. She decides to visit Sri Lanka, for Adam, but her plan is
thwarted
— first by a terrorist bombing in Colombo, then by her mother’s
revelafion ffiat Alastair Fraser was flot Clare’s biological father.
Rudy Vantwest, a polifical idealist, feels out of place in society and in bis
family, and is burdened by guilt and resentrnent over bis relafionship with
Adam, the broffier whose birth Rudy’s mother did not survive. Rudy
obsessively revisits the past and writes diary enfries to Clare Fraser, a woman he
has neyer spoken to but to whom he has felt allied since the day he secretly
watched her scafter her father’s ashes. In an attempt to redefine himself, Rudy
has retumed to Sn Lanka, where he lives with bis aunt and teaches English at a
pnvate school. One of bis students, a Tamil boy who endorses the terror tacfics
of the Liberation Tigers of Tarnil Felam, reminds him of Adam, and the
resemblance intensifies Rudy’s guilt and resentment. His sense of himself and bis
family relafionships is radicaliy transforrned, however, by bis brother’s accident
and by the bombing in Colombo, to which he is lured by his student. The bomb
leaves him with a cracked pelvis ai-id a collection of haunting visions and fears,
yet it puts him in contact with bis long-est:ranged uncle, Ernie Van Twest, who
cornes to check on him and who proves crucial to Rudy’s development.
Rudy’s and Clare’s confticts echo turmoils in the lives of Rudy’s father,
Alec, and Clare’s mother, Isobel. As a boy, living on a tea estate in Ceylon, Alec
Van Twest is exasperated wiffi the dullness of bis life and fantasizes about the
excitement of the war in Europe and the Pacific. On one hot, slow day during the
Easter holidays, he discovers bis older brother, Fi-nie, kissing another man
bebind the tea factory. Alec, though traumatized by the discovery, “outs” bis
brother, hoping to stir up conflict at home. The resuit of bis announcement is
not, as he expects, a noisy row between bis father and Fi-nie but, rather, Emie’s
quiet departure from the family. Over the years, Alec cornes to be haunted by
42
the consequences of his actions and by a belief that fate has singled him out for
refribufion
— most emphatically through his homosexual son, Adam.
Like Alec, the teenage Isobel finds her world hopelessly duli and dreams
of leaving her smalÏ town in Scofland. An opportunity arises when she meets
Alastair Fraser, a man whom she finds boring and unattracive but who is
planning to immigrate to Canada. She allows Alastair to court her, but the
courtship is undermined by two developments: Isobel experiences a sexual
awakening wiffi her best friend, Margaret, and, to combat her guilt and
confusion, she inifiates a sexual relafionship wiffi her father’s apprenfice, Pafrick
Locke. Denying both her attraction to Margaret and her suspicions that she is
pregnant, she accepts Alastair’s proposai of marnage and moves with him to
Montreal.
In response to the upheavals in their respective lives, Clare decides to find
her biological father in Scotiand, while Rudy, as an act of atonement, climbs
Adam’s Peak, the sacred mountain after which his brother is named. Clare’s
encounters with fric compulsive taiker Pafrick Locke and with her mother’s
childhood friend Margaret, now a Church of Scofland mïnister, lead her to the
chilling realizafion that her mother is as much a stranger to lier as the father she
neyer knew. Believing herseif to be sfripped of ail attachments, Clare revives her
plan to travel to Si-i Lanka and conceives of this joumey as a breaking away
from her family, her past, and lier debilitafing awkwardness. Around the same
fime, Rudy, stiui weak in the aftermath of the bombing, makes the long,
gruelling ascent of Adam’s Peak with bis Uncle Emie. They reach the summit,
barely, where Rudy is suddenly sfruck by fric fufflity of bis gesture. Desperate to
strengtlien bis family relafionships and bis identity in a more meamngful,
concrete way — a desire that is fuelled by Emie’s indifference to his own
estrangement from the Vantwest family — Rudy decides to retum to Canada as
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soon as possible.
Rudy and Clare cross paths at Heathrow Airport. Clare spots Rudy first
and spends several anxious minutes contemplafing ffie nature of the force
— is it
coincidence? fate? choice? — ffiat has brought them together. Summoning her
new-found self-assurance, she walks across the concourse to speak to him, and
their eyes meet, as they did on the August day when they were chiidren.
Six years later, Rudy writes a letter to Clare, who is now living in the U.K.
Rudy is in Toronto, where he lives with bis sister and shares in the care of bis
niece. The letter contains a recent photograph, taken at Adam’s graduation from
the M.A. program he started before the accident. His tone friendly and familiar,
Rudy updates Clare on bis family’s activities and reveals the extent to which bis
own life revolves around relationsbips and commitments he previously sought
to escape. Rudy wishes Clare well on her upcoming recital. He also mentions
Isobel’s second marnage and the peace talks in Sn Lanka. His hope is that both
are going well, but he acknowledges that looks can 5e deceiving.
As they sfruggle to resolve their various confticts, Clare, Rudy, Mec, and
Isobel are each forced to confront, on the one hand, ffie unknowabulity of
people’s inner lives and, on the other, the powerful connections between their
relafionships with other people and their own idenfities.
Adarn’s Peak is organized into four parts separated by three “interludes.”
The first three parts contain six chapters each, and these chapters alternate in
their point of view bebveen Rudy and Clare. Part Four has two chapters, one
from Rudy’s point of view and one from Clare’s. Events from Isobel’s and Alec’s
ljves in Scotland and Sn Lanka are dramahzed in the interludes, which are
written from those characters’ points of view. Interlude One has two sections,
which introduce the two different storylines, Isobel’s and Alec’s. Interlude Two is
the conclusion of Isobel’s story; Interlude Three is the conclusion of Alec’s. The
novel also features a short prologue, consisfing of one of Clare’s imagined
conversations, and an epilogue, consisting of Rudy’s letter to Clare. The
narrative is wriften in the past tense, with ffie exception of ti e flashbacks to
Rudy’s chuldhood, which are in the present tense.
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Chapter Three
Conceptions of Identity in Adant’s Peak
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The struggles in which the central characters of Adam’s Peak are engaged
are importantly connected to questions of idenfity and to the characters’
attempts to consftuct meaningful identities for themselves. Through the
characters of Rudy Vantwest and Clare Fraser, whose identifies are in crisis, and
through Kanda Selvarajah and Adam Vanflvest, who share a much stronger
sense of who ffiey are, the text dramafizes
— and complicates
— the three
conceptions of idenfity that I discussed in Chapter One. The collective and ffie
monological conceptions, of which that chapter is critical, are revealed in Adam’s
Peak to have potentially positive implications. Those implications must, however,
be understood in the context of the novel’s crificisms and its broader
commentary on the nature of human idenfity. We might usefully conceive of our
identity in collective or monological terms, the text suggests, but those
conceptions, if adopted without recognifion of the dialogically determined
horizons against which ve determine who we are, are ultimately destructive.
Throughout much of Adam’s Peak, Rudy and Clare exhibit what Taylor
describes as “a radical uncertainty of where they stand” (Sources 27). Each, in
other words, is experiencing a sort of idenfity ci-isis. Having uprooted himself
from his life in Canada, Rudy asks himself what he was ther
— “An outsider?
Maybe. A bystander? Usually. A resentful, cranky bastard in any case” (3) — and
his responses confirm for him the wisdom of his decision to reconstruct himself
in a new setting. As he later says to his uncle, “I expected that coming back [to Sri
Lankaï would give me a sense of who I really am” (311). Clare, at the beginning
of the novel, retums from a visit with her friend Emma, desperately frusfrated
with the “agonizing” familiarity of her existence (67) and with the “silent, stony
person” (69) she believes she has become. She wants to reconsftuct her identity,
to “become someone new” (29), but she is inifially more uncertain than Rudy is
about the practical, concrete changes she should make in order to become a
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different person (“I don’t know what’s right for me” [69], she says in an
imagined conversation with her friend Emma). In their absbact conceptions of
themselves, however, both Rudy and Clare adopt a monological view of
identity.
Clare conceives of the identity she would like to have in terms of a
distancing from significant others, parficularly her parents and her boss.
Significantly, Clare’s sense of self at the beginning of the novel hints at a
dialogical conception of idenfity. She understands herseif in relation to other
people: lier father, whose cnppling shyness and awkwardness she has
“inherited”; her mother, in whose presence she has difficulty thinldng of herseif
as an aduit; her boss, Marcus, whose quietness and sexual repression serve as a
“horizon of meaning,” to use Taylor’s term
— a daily reminder to Clare of the
kind of person she herseif presents to the social world, the “kind of parffier she
was fated to be with” (101). Clare also understands herseif in relation to Emma,
with whom she implicitly establishes such things as social and sexual confidence
as “horizons of mearting”
— horizons against which Clare views herseif as
deficient, “stuck in a perpetual adolescence” (103). She conceives of her identity
dialogically, then, but negafively, and her response to this conception is to strive
for a monologically consftucted self. Her idea of moving to Vancouver
represents a detachment from her relafionships with her faffier (who is
associated, through winter imagery, with Monfreal), her mother, with whom she
has lived for most of lier life, and Marcus. Later in the novel, when Clare
considers travelling to Sri Lanka, she imagines a solitary self, free of the
influences of those relationships:
“[. . .1 the person she saw, strolling breezily in
sandals and a bright pink sarong, chestnut hair tied in a loose knot under a wide
brimmed hat, seemed an ideal of Clare Fraser” (314). This “ideal of Clare
Fraser,” strolling through a tropical country in warm colours, is implicitly an
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unencumbered self, a self free of the metaphorical and actual frigidity of her
Monfreal existence and the relafionships ït comprises.
Rudy, too, sees himself as redefining his idenfity by detaching himself
from relafionships and connections. In Canada, bis sense of himself is largely
constituted
— dialogicafly, like Clare’s
— by bis relalionships with bis family. The
identity he has acquired through these relafionships is, again like Clare’s,
primarily a negative one. In the context of lis roles within the Vantwest family,
lie views himself as “resentful,” “cranky,” and, most of alT, “impotent” (6). He
wants “to 5e helpfuÏ, to be significant in some way” (6), parficularly in relation to
bis sister, but, sensing that it is Adam whom Susie “cails for” (6) in limes of need,
he retreats from any kind of meaningful interaction with Susie or her young
daughter. Rudy’s relafionship with bis brother also frustrates him. Since
chuldhood, he has wanted “to be a decent brother” (83) to Adam, but resentment
of Adam, combined with Rudy’s own introversion, lias undermined bis desires.
Rtidy’s identity within lis web of family relationsbips is, thus, one of unfulfilled
roles
— a frusfrated dialogicality, as it were. He responds to this frustration by
detaching himself from lis family and attempfing to reconsfruct himself,
monologically, in Colombo: “The idea was to fry things ont for a school year,
without commitments, then, assuming he adjusted well enough
— he had no
idea what he’d do if he didn’t — seffle down. Find a house, doser to the city, and
eventually, perhaps, a companion” (16). 0f parficular significance in this one-year
plan is Rudy’s sense of being “without commitments”
— an unencumbered self.31
He allows that he may in lime “settle down” and establish new commitments in
the form of a career and a home, but the idea of forming an important human
commitment, of defining himself in relation to “a companion,” is only a
While it is true that Rudy initïally lives with his aunt in Cotombo, he does flot see
his identity as being significantly constituted by his relationship wïth ber. He lives with ber,
he implies, as a convenience, and plans to move ont as soon as possible.
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possibility, a “perhaps.”
The other web of significant relationships from which Rudy wishes to
exftact himself
— and in so doing redefine himself
— is bis Toronto social life. In
relation to the women he dates, in particular, he has acquired an idenfity of
exotic othemess, with which he is “fed up” (5). Having left Toronto, he recails
that in the presence of women who found Mm exotic, and therefore “incapable
of being boring,” he would become “someone not quite Mmself, peppering bis
descriptions of ‘home’ with tropical flavours and smells, using Sinhalese words
whose meanings had escaped him, admiring the confrast in their skin tones
when they made love” (9). This “someone not quite himself”
— the sensual,
exofic lover
— is a feature of Rudy’s idenUty that he has actively helped to create,
in dialogue with the women he dates; yet he finds it uncomfortable,
“embarrassing” (9), in part because of its essentializing of bis Sri Lankan
background (his partners assume that bis exoticness prevents Mm from being
boring). Instead of renegofiating bis idenfity within the context of those
relationships, however, Rudy chooses to reject the relationsbips. In conceiving of
Sri Lanka as a place where he is “not exofic,” and where people acknowledge
him “with little more than polite but indifferent nods” (15), he again hints at a
desire to construct Mmself monologically. For in being an ordinary face in the
crowd, whom people scarcely notice, he is, implicitly, unattached and
unencumbered, free to make of himself what he vil1.
The monological conception of idenbty ffiat Rudy and Clare adopt
contrasts, in their experiences and in the novel as a whole, wiffi the collective and
dialogical conceptions of the self. The collective conception is dramafized most
strikingly through the character of Kanda Selvarajah, a sixteen-year-old boy in
Rudy’s English 12 class and a supporter of the LTTE’s sovereignty project. The
dialogical conception finds its most explicit expression in Adam Vantwest, who
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appears only briefty in the narrative’s present, in an encounter with Clare.
Through his written communications with Rudy, Kanda suggests that bis
idenfity is consfituted by bis membership in a particular collective, namely the
Tamil people of Sri Lanka. When Rudy asks the boy to write an essay discussing
the counfry’s political turmoils from the point of view of a Sinhalese person,
Kanda responds wfth a letter, in which he invokes the idea of essentialized,
collective idenfities as an explanafion for bis inability to complete the assignment:
I tried to write about Sri Lanka’s problems fro’-n the viewpoint of
someone else, but it was not possible. What I mean to say is that I
am able to write the essay, but it would not 5e true. I was bom as a
Tamil and that is what is true for me. I can listen to another man’s
point of view but I cannot experience it. I cannot write about this
counh-y’s difficulties as a Sinhalese, but only as a Tamil pretending
to 5e Sinhalese. I do not see a purpose to this. My impressions of
the Sinhalese life will be influenced by my Tamil thinking and
therefore will be incorrect. [. . .1 The assignment you gave is only
fantasy. Every person is formed by bis culture and bis race, and
that is how he should conduct himself in the world. You would not
ask a gazelle to 5e a lion or to understand a lion’s point of view.
Human Seings are no different. I am a Tamil. That is how I tbink
and conduct myseif. I do not dislike the Sinhalese. The gazelle does
not dislike the lion, but it will do what it must to survive in the
lion’s presence. (203)
Kanda’s assertion that every person is “formed by bis culture and bis race,” and
that he himself tbinks and conducts himself as a Tamil, suggests that identity 15
sometbing bestowed on the individual early in life, by virtue of bis or her
membership in a cultural collective, and that the particular identity that one is
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given implies a limited range of ways of thinking and behaving in the world.
These limitations are also evoked by his animal simile: human identity, he
implies, is instinctual; we cari no more escape our designated way of being than a
lion could escape its impulse to khI its prey. Kanda’s further daim that any
attempt on bis part to understand the Sinhalese point of view “would not be
true” is suggestive of what Michael Ignatieff calis the “you just don’t
understand’ aspects of idenfity polifics” (97). The idea that a Tamil person cannot
authenfically or usefully understand a Sinhalese person’s point of view, and vice
versa, implies not only that there exists an essential, measurable Tamil, or
Sinhalese, point of view (an assumption that Rudy allows in his framing of the
essay question) but also that such a perspective is inaccessible to someone who
does flot share the designated features of the group in question.
In contrast with Kanda, Adam Vantwest accepts and implicftly endorses
the idea that we are conshtuted by our communal relationships, both chosen and
unchosen. While Adam acknowledges the importance of collective belongings,
including bis own membership in a “gay community” and his niece Zoê’s
membership in a “deaf community” (25), and wbile he expresses a certain
commitment to individualism and the ethic of authenticity in bis desire to find a
career that lie is “meant to do” (24), lis pivotai interaction with his neighbour
Clare Fraser demonstrates a more dialogical understanding of the self. Adam
offers to take Clare to the shops on bis motorcycle flot because lie likes ber or
wants sometffing from lier but because he sees her, by virtue of her physical
proximity, as a significant other. As lie remarks in the dépanneur,
I’ve been living on that street for almost twenty-five years now,
and do you know, I don’t know a damn thing about any of my
neiglibours? Nothing important anyway — it’s really pathefic. [.. .1
I’m kind of a hypocrite. I complain about liow impersonal
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twentieth-century life bas become, but I don’t do anything about it.
(77)
What Adam refers to as the “impersonal” nature of twentieth-century life is
connected to the sort of extreme social atomïsm that Taylor discusses,32 whereby
individuals are so isolated and cenfred on themselves (or, at most, their
immediate families) that they fail to engage in meaningful ways with those
significant ofrters who consfitute their community (where “community” is taken
to comprise the various people with whom one has regular interactions). Adam’s
comments imply that neighbours, because they are people with whom one bas
regular interactions, are significant others and are therefore worthy of attention.
When Adam insists on paying for Clare’s eggs, saying that an egg-borrowing
arrangement will allow the Vantwests and the Frasers to become “real
neighbours” (80), he endorses a dialogical understanding of the self. The
relauonship implied by the reciprocal borrowing will change the participants’
identifies, he suggests, for ffiey will take on the role of “neighbour” in a more
constitutive, “real” way
— a change that Adam treats as positive. The eggs
themselves further highlight the idea of dialogical idenfity construction through
ffieir connection to conception, creafion, and relafionships. On the retum journey
from the dépanneur, Clare looks down at the carton of eggs “wedged between
herseif and Adam” on the motorcycle seat (81), and this image evokes both their
newly strengthened relafionship and the embryonic idenfity changes that the
relafionship has generated, parficularly in Clare. For through lier brief
interaction with Adam, Clare senses not only that she bas become a “real
neighbour,” but that her idenfity bas shifted away from “the Clare Fraser who
needs more colour in her life” (75).
32 Taylor’s essay “Atomism” examines the issue of political atomism, a term he
uses to characterize “a vision of society as in some sense constituted by individuals for the
fulfilment of ends which [are] primarily individual” (29).
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To this point in my analysis of Adnin’s Peak, I have ouffined some of the
important ways in which the novel dramatizes the three conceptions of identity
that are central to this study. It is necessary now to turn to the attitudes that the
text expresses toward those ffiree conceptions. In very general terms, the novel’s
position can be described as a pragmatic one, which acknowledges that rigid
abstract principles do not, nor should they, govern the way people conduct
themselves in the world. More specifically, the text’s endorsement of the
dialogical conception of identity is tempered by a recognffion that collective and
monological understandings of the self can, and even should, be adopted under
certain circumstances. In its crfficisms of these understandings, however, as welI
as in its general plot development and form, the novel ultimately suggests that,
as a “default” understanding of the self, the dialogical conception of identity is
the most useful and benefidal of the three.
The potential benefits of understanding one’s identity monologically are
dramatized most obviously through Clare’s eventual arrival at a positive sense
of self. By the end of the novel, she lias detached herself from her father’s
influence, as suggested by the graduai diminishment of her imagined
conversations with him, and she has left her mother, her insular Morgan Road
existence, and Marcus by travelling to Europe (and, metaphorically, by
discovering her sexuality). She lias even rejected the self she might become,
dialogically, as “the unplanned biological daughter of Pafrick Locke and Isobel
McGuigan, adopted early on by Alastair Fraser” (333). Importantly, Clare begins
to conceive of herseif as “sovereigri — neither Scottish nor Canadian, not Fraser
or Locke or McGuigan” (334). This sense of detachedness, or “sovereignty,”
from relationships is freated by Clare, and by the text, as a positive
development. For in distancing herseif from her central defining relationships,
she has finally succeeded in conceiving of her identity in positive tenus. From a
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chronic adolescent plagued by crippling awkwardness, she becomes a
comfortable aduit, capable of travelling and experiencing sexual pleasure
—
someone who might, as she imagines, live in Paris (359) and who, as Rudy’s
concluding letter implies, manages to pursue a career in music (363). In her
adopting of what might 5e called a strategic monologism, Clare echoes Taylor’s
acknowledgment that our ties to others “can easily 5e in conflict with our
personal development,” and that, “in certain contexts, where one is struggiing to
define a fragile and conflicted idenfity, forgetting the constraints can seem the
only path to survival” (Malaise 57). Like Taylor, then, the tex. of Adarn’s Peak
allows that it can be useful to conceive of the self monologically, by “forgetting”
the connections and relationships that have determined who we are.
Yet the novel works to point out, again through Clare, that a strategic
forgetting of the dialogical nature of human identity does not alter or erase the
existence of that nature. Clare senses that she is “sovereign,” consfrucfing herseif
independently, yet the concrete changes in her life suggest that she is in fact
establishing stronger connections to the social world. Those connections,
moreover, begin to have an important influence on her identity. Toward the end
of the novel, Clare’s wiliingness and ability to contact her biological father and
her mother’s friend Margaret (both strangers to her), as well as the
diminishment of her interior conversations, signais that she has become more
engaged with the social world, and that her existence, by extension, has become
more dialogicai. It is her reiationship wiffi Adam, however, that most sfrikingly
dramatizes the persistently dialogical nature of her identity construction.
Alffiough she inwardly protests, when confronted with the seemingly
unavoidable presence of the Vantwests in her life, that she wants “a new life, but
on her own terms” (112), Clare’s development is clearly shaped by her
relafionship with Adam Vantwest. The idea of travelling to Sri Lanka has
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significance for her, becomes crucial to the way she imagines herseif (her “ideal
of Clare Fraser,” as I noted earlier, is situated in Sri Lanka), because she has
experienced that idea in dialogue with Adam. She pictures herseif alone in Sn
Lanka, but her decision to go there is made against a “background of
intelligibility,” to use Taylor’s term, that has been established socially —
primarily with Adam, but also with Adam’s father and aunt, whom Clare and
her mother visit, and with Pafrick Locke, who describes for Clare his ascent of
Adam’s Peak. Significantly, when Clare spots Rudy at Heathrow Airport, at the
end of the novel, she recognizes that an encounter with him has the potential to
change her. Such an encounter, she believes, “could not be ignored”; it must be
permitted “to change her plans even” (359). This acceptance of the social nature
of her existence — she cannot “ignore” other people, as she tried to do when she
crossed paths with Adam
— and of the potenfial of social connections to
influence pians that are central to her identity33 suggests that ulfimately Clare’s
monological sense of self is a fiction.
But while the fiction of the monological self proves useful to Clare, for
Rudy it is defrimental. Rudy’s efforts to distance himself from significant others
are not only unsuccessful; they make him unhappy. Having aftempted, like
Clare, to “shake off” his Morgan Road past, he finds that that past, and the
relationships of which it is comprised, persistently “crowd bis present” (4). His
inabulity to “shake off” the ïdentity he has acquired over bis years in Canada is
hinted at metonymically through bis chronic sweating. Rudy’s identity, like bis
body — wbich once was comfortable in tropical heat but is no longer
— has
undergone “some sort of mutation” (2) wffile in Canada. The change that Rudy
ffiinks of as a graduai “transformation of bis celis” (3) is also a transformation of
At this point in the novel, Clare has decided that she wiII leave her Morgan Road
life for good and study music in Paris.
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bis self, a change that has made it impossible for him to feel enfirely comfortable
in Sn Lanka. His inabulity to jettison bis “Canadian” relationships and identity is
revealed more explicffly through his obsessive memories of family interactions
and of his own role in those interactions. These memories, by “crowding” his
consciousness, effecfively remain intrinsic to Rudy’s identity and prevent him
from reconstructing himself monologically. Throughout the novel, the tension
between his inability to cast off bis significant relafionships and his desire to
reconsftuct himself monologically provokes in him a range of negabve
emofions. After recalling a childhood confrontation with Adam, for instance,
Rudy lies in bis aunt’s garden, “ftying to feel connected” to the tropical
surroundings of bis new home (64). In an important sense, he is trying to detach
himself from bis Morgan Road memories and to reimagine bis idenfity in a Sri
Lankan contexi. But the idea of feeling connected to Sri Lanka reminds him of
Adam (who displays a keen interest in the country, even though he has neyer
been there), and Rudy finds himself metaphorically stuck “in bis Morgan Road
bedroom,” feeling, as he did during the long-ago confrontation, like a “lousy
brother” (64). The fact that Adam’s recent letter, which Rudy reads in the garden,
does not attempt a reciprocal detachment from their relationship leaves Rudy
with a sense of “self-loatbing” (64). Implicffly, if Adam, as weIl as Rudy’s own
consciousness (and body), would allow bim to shake off bis Morgan Road
identity and ail of its troublesome features, he would have no cause to feel lousy
or self-loathing — this is the sort of freedom from attachments that Gail Sheehy’s
text envisions. But such a detacbment, the text of Adarn’s Peak suggests, is
impossible. The options available to Rudy, uffimately, are either to carry on
unhappily pursuing an impossible monologism; to adopt, like Clare, a “fichonal”
sense of self; or to reconsftuct bis idenfity witbin the context of bis significant
relafionships (which are themselves subject to reconstruction).
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Rudy’s and Clare’s idenfity crises dramatize the possibilities and
limitations of ffie monological conception of the self; yet their crises are part of
the novel’s broader investigation of idenfity in modem culture, an investigation
which also includes an exploration of the possibilities and limitations of the
collective conception of the self. This exploration is woven through Clare’s and,
more emphatically, Rudy’s stories. It is also crucial to the novel’s treatnient of its
“real world” polifical context (Sri Lanka’s and, to a lesser degree, Canada’s
sovereignty movements). As I suggested earlier, the character of Kanda
Selvarajah dramatizes most sfrikingly the beliefs and assumptions behind the
conception of identity offered by nationalist organizations such as the LTTE. The
potenfial benefits and drawbacks of this conception are, similarly, revealed
through Kanda; however, several of the novel’s other characters engage in
dialogues about Sri Lanka’s politics and about t.he idea of collective idenfity,
thereby confributing to the novel’s overail commentary on the collective
conception of the self.
Just as the character of Clare demonstrates that a monological
understanding of identity can contribute to a more positive sense of self, Kanda
demonstrates the confidence that might derive from a collective sense of self.
Throughout the novel, Kanda exhibits tremendous confidence. His self-assurance
at school cornes in part from bis intellect — bis “command o’ the lessons” (44)
and bis broad range of scholarly reading. But it also cornes, implicitly, from his
sense of being firmly embedded in a collective — the Tamil people of Sri Lanka
— wbich is much larger than hirnself. Kanda’s letter to Rudy, quoted above,
suggests a strong connection between the boy’s repeated identification of
himself “as a Tamil” (he mentions it four times) and the confidence, the audacity
even, that he displays, not only in refusing to follow his teacher’s instructions but
in describing the assignment Rudy has given bim as “only fantasy.” The boy’s
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confidence, moreover, is not simply a matter of being able to express and act
upon his convictions. It is also a confidence in bis selfhood. Unlike Rudy and
Clare, Kanda does not wonder who he is; bis identity shows no signs of being in
crisis. “I am a Tamil,” he declares in Fils letter; “[tihat is how tbink and conduct
myseif.” In identifying himself flot as an individual teenage boy, who must
discover bis own way and place in the world, but as part of an entire people,
from whom he has inhented a parficular way of thinking and behaving, Kanda
effecfively thwarts ffie kind of self-doubt ffiat torments Rudy and Clare as they
sftuggle to figure out what it is that they value, what it is good to 5e.
Sigmficantly, and paradoxically, one of the other characters in Adarn’s Peak
to express, more explicitly than Kanda, the potential benefits of a collective
conception of the self is Rudy. Despite bis impulse to define himself
monologically, and despite bis ulbmate rejection of the the collective conception
of identity that Kanda espouses, Rudy acknowledges his own attraction to that
conception. Stroffing through the grounds of bis aunt’s church, he recails an
Faster Mass during wbich he “watched the rest of the congrgation crowding the
railing for Holy Communion” and “envied them their collective sense of
importance” (14-15). Most striking in tbis recollection is the fact that it is not the
faith of the worsffippers that Rudy envies — he himself is “flot a believer” (49) —
but rather the strength, the “sense of importance,” that those worsbippers
experience by virtue of their collectiveness, their shared identity. Climbing
Adam’s Peak with bis uncle, Rudy revisits this idea. He characterizes bis decision
to move back to Sn Lanka not as a means of detaching himself from bis Morgan
Road relationships and identity but as an attempt to partidpate in a form of
collective idenhty:
[...] I actually thought I’d corne back here and there’d be some
ldnd of mystical vibe, some essential Sri Lankanness, connecting
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me to everything. [...J I think I expected that the moment I
stepped off the plane I’d notice something. [...J I thought I’d be in
my groove. (312)
Evident in Rudy’s use of the terms “mystical” and “everything” is a desire to be
connected to something greater than himself. His expectation that such a
connection would put him in Fils “groove” suggests
— if “being in one’s groove”
can be understood as a state of being comfortable with one’s identity
— that
identification with a collective is crucial to the forming and sustaining of a sense
of self. In short, Rudy’s desires demonsfrate that, as Michael Ignafieff points out,
“we’re not just individuals
— we need collective belongings” (96).
Importantly, though, Rudy’s account of lis search for a connection that
would put him in “Fils groove” bints at the naivety of relying on a parficular
collective belonging as a source of selffiood. His tone as he describes his desires is
“mocking” (312), whule bis implicitly self-critical recollection that he “actually
thought” Fie would discover an “essential Sri Lankanness” suggests that he now
finds such an expectafion naive. Retuming to Sri Larika was not, Rudy concludes,
what he “was hoping for” (312) — Fie did not feel connected to everything and
did flot, he suggests, discover Fils groove, bis identity. As Fie observes, he is not
“a complete stranger” in Sn Lanka (312). He is able to identify, to some extent,
with the people and situations lie encounters there. But what he has not
managed to do is to reconsfruct bis idenfity simply by placing himself among
people with whom Fie shares the label of “Sri Lankan.” As bis encounter with the
Canadian teenagers — with whom “Fie could easily have chatted [. . .] about an
infinite number of topics” (310) — reveals, bis years in Canada have shaped lis
idenfity sïgnificanfly. He bas become, we could say, more Canadian than Sri
Lankan. Rudy’s connection to the teenagers, however, suggests something more
complicated than a diluting of an originally-pure “Sri Lankan” identity, or a
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merging of such an identity wfth a “Canadian” one. The idea that he is able to
“chat” with the teenagers about a variety of topics cails attention to the dialogic
nature of idenfity formation. Rudy’s idenfity bas changed in Canada not because
he has been assimilated into a collective of “Canadians,” but because be has been
in dialogue wiffi a parficular web of people, a web ffiat is different from the one
in whicb he was embedded when he first lived in Sri Lanka. In returning to Sri
Lanka and culfivating for himself a new “web of interlocution,” to borrow
Taylor’s term, Rudy bas presumably subjected bis identity to new
transformations. But just as the web of roles and relationships of bis existence in
Canada bas prevented him from reconsftucting himself monologicaÏly, 50 too
does the ongoing influence of those roles and relationshïps make it impossible
for him to conceive of himself unproblematically in ternis of bis connection to an
abstract collective of Sri Lankans.
Rudy’s suggestion that collective conceptions of the self are untenable
takes on further weïght in Adam’s Peak through the novel’s polifical context. In
Chapter One of this study, I discussed the rhetoric of important Sri Lankan
polifical groups, groups who invoke essenfialized collective identities and who, in
the recent past, have resorted to or implicifiy condoned violence as a means of
asserfing and preserving those identifies. In Adarn’s Peak, sigrtificant plot and
character developments stem from a historically-based bombing of a Colombo
office building
— an incident that is linked to the LTTE’s sovereignty project.
The novel’s freatment of this project, and of the ideas expressed by Rudy’s
On the morning of January 31, 1996, a truck loaded with explosives drove into the
Central Bank of Ceylon, in Colombo’s downtown business district, destroying the building
and killing or injuring over a thousand people. The LTTE neyer officially claimed, nor
denied, responsibility for the attack, though they are widely thought to have organized it in
response to the army’s capturing of the Jaffna Peninsula in December 1995. In Adam’s
Peak, the bombing is shifted from January to March, and the targeted building is identifled
simply as an office building.
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student Kanda (who is possibly implicated in the Colombo bombing), serve to
foreground not only the ffieorefical problems but also the dangers of collective
conceptions of identity.
Kanda’s letter to Rudy
— a response to Rudy’s request that he consider
Sn Lanka’s political troubles from a Sinhalese perspective — expresses an
understanding of identity that is similar to, though more polemical than, that of
the LTTE’s vision statement. Both texts treat individual ïdentity as being, to use
Gilbert’s terms, “embedded in that of the community in a very strong sense”
(115). Earlier in this chapter, I discussed Kanda’s letter, in fairly neufral terms, as
an expression of this collective conception of identity; yet the letter invites a
more oppositional reading. For in conceiving of bis identity as being entirely
determined by his membership in a particular collective, Kanda makes two
ffighly problematic moves: first, he imposes on bis sodety (and, by extension, on
humanity) a rigid, divisive, and artificial system of classification; secondly, he
abdicates bis own polifical and moral responsibility to an entity based on that
system.
In bis letter, Kanda not only consfructs a rigid cultural, even ontological,
difference between Tamil people and Sinhalese people, he does so in a manner
that problematically assumes the existence of tension and intolerance between
the two groups. As I suggested earlier, Kanda’s letter, with its references to such
things as “Tamil thinldng” and “Sinhalese life” (203), implies that members of
each group exhibit a particular way of tbinking and behaving and that those
ways of thinking and behavïng do flot franscend cultural boundaries. In
comparing Tamil people and Sinhalese people to gazelles and lions35
— different,
Kanda’s choice of animais is flot arbitrary. The lion is associated with Sri
Lanka’s Sinhalese population (sinha = lion) and is pictured on the natïonal flag. Kanda
connects the symbolic lion and the people it represents with the aggressÏve hunting
behaviours of the African lion. The non-aggressive, “victimized” gazelle is, Kanda
suggests, representative of the Tamil population.
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socially incompatible species — Kanda further implies the existence of what
Hardt and Negri cail “an absolute radai difference” (103) between the two
groups, a difference that is natural, immutable, and, moreover, an inescapable
source of conffict. In other words, Kanda’s animal metaphor essenfializes the
tensions between Tamil people and Sinhalese people. The theorefical problem
with this charactenzation of the two groups is, of course, that the differences and
tensions which he attempts to naturalize are sodally and historically contingent
(Kanda himself acknowledges the historical contingency of the Tamil-Sinhalese
conflict when he writes in an essay that the “Tamil cause has not always been
violent, and it has not aiways fried to gain independence” [49-50]). Like his
notion of a collective Tamil identity, then, Kanda’s conception of the differences
between, and incompafibility of, Tamil people and Sinhalese people is a fiction.
The danger of this construction of an “absolute racial difference” on the
theoretical, “imaginary plane,” is, as Hardt and Negri point out, that such
constructions correspond “on the practical plane to radai subordination and
social purification” (103). Though Kanda does not explicitly argue for the
superiority of Tamil people over Sinhalese people, his implïed assumplion that
there is a fundamental, and conflict-provoking, ontological difference between
the two is precisely the sort of assumption that fuels projects of racial
discrimination, segregation and, at a particularly sinister extreme, “ethnic
cleansing.”
Importantly, while the divisions and tensions that Kanda describes may
seem sfrildngly present when events such as the Colombo bank bombing occur,
generalizafions based on such events do not reflect ffie day to day realities of Sri
Lankan society. To say that the violent clashes that have plagued Sri Lanka for
36 Hardt and Negrï are discussing here the conflating of nation and race in European
nationalist movements. They argue that “European societies and peoples were neyer really
pure and uniform” (103).
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decades are reflective of the quotidian interactions between Tamil and Sinhalese
people is to distort and reduce what Suvendrini Perera calis the complex
“coexistence” of people “who have lived together over centuries, in love and
war, conflict and collaboration” (16). Essenfialized charadenzations of Sri Larika’s
people and conflicts are fictions, Perera suggests
— fictions through which
“[a]reas of cultural, linguisfic and religious overlap, of common regional
affiliations and daily interactions in shared spaces, are overwritten by the
organisation of a various population into distinct racial/ethnic categories [. .
(15). Against this narrative of discrete, essenfialized collective identities, Perera
cails attention to the “complex, intertwined histories and enmeshed, interlocking
identifies,” the “dense, unfidy tapesfry of interactions, peaceful and otherwise,”
that charactenze the people of Sri Lanka (15). The language that Perera uses to
describe Sri Lankan society is worth noting, for it powerfully evokes a dialogical
conception of idenfity formation. The ideas of “coexistence” and cultural
“overlap,”of “interlocking identifies” and “daily interactions in shared spaces”
cali to mmd a multiplicity of complex individuals engagmg in a mulfiplicity of
exchanges, in which the values and choices that constitute the self are negofiated.
These negofiafions are, as the dialogical conception of identity implies, and as
Perera recognizes, “complex” and “unfidy.” They also result in “areas of cultural,
linguisfic and religious overlap” — shared understandings of the world, shared
“horizons of meaning,” to use Taylor’s term — which transcend the divisions
imposed by essenfialized effinic categories.
Adaiîz ‘s Peak challenges Kanda’s essentializing narrative with a view of Sri
Lankan society that parallels Perera’s. Kanda himself offers an example of “daily
interactions in shared spaces” when he spends lime, as Rudy notes, “chumming
around with a group of other students, none of them Tamil” (285). In other
words, though the boy insists that his idenfity is shaped enfirely by Tamil
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culture, the dialogical interactions — the “chumming around”
— of his day to
day existence as a student in an ethnically mixed school suggest that he is
influenced by people and ideas outside the reaim of “Tamil culture.” More
emphafically than through Kanda’s school life, however, the novel dramatizes
Sri Lanka’s culture of dialogical coexistence through references to the piigrimage
site of Adam’s Peak.
Adarn’s Peak (Sri Pada in Sinhala, SwangarrÏzanam in Tamil) is recognized
by members of ail of Sri Lanka’s major religious and ethnic communifies as a
sacred place, and the novel treats ffiis shared sacred space as a metonym of the
“coexistence” and “interlocking idenfities” of ffie country’s people. Ascents of the
peak are made, recalled, or anticipated throughout the novel, and at several of
these points the text cails attention to the dialogical relations that exist between
those groups that Kanda would keep separate. Clare’s biological father, Paftick
Locke, remarks on the communal spirit he observed while ciimbing the peak as a
young man (334). Rudy’s Uncle Ernie reveals, as lie and Rudy make their ascent,
that although Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, and Chrisfians connect the peak with
different myths, each of those myffis, by virtue of cultural and religious overlap,
involves the footprint of a sacred figure (Buddha, Shiva, or Adam) and has led to
the tradition of making pilgrimages to the peak to view a single concrete
footprint (283). In a more subfle way, Rudy’s grandfather’s account of climbing
Adam’s Peak with the young Emie and the deaf tea taster, Amiffia, also connects
the site to the ideas of cultural overlap and dialogically formed identities. The
account, written in Grandpa’s diary, says that when he went looking for Ernie at
the summit, to explain to him the true “greafrtess of the peak,” he found “the
bugger cavorting with a pair of village buts, ffie lot of them giggiing and
pratUing away in Sinhalese,” while Amitha “seemed in a foui mood, for reasons
unknown” (94). What Grandpa’s diary offers, in spite of its clear disapproval of
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Emie’s behaviour and of the villagers, is a glimpse at what Perera calis the
“dense, unfidy tapesfry of interactions”
— the cross-cultural, dialogical
relationships
— that characterizes the day to day existence of the people of Sri
Lanka. Grandpa wants to insist that the significance of Adam’s Peak consists in
the individual’s capacity to conquer it; yet Ernie challenges his father’s
individualisfic interpretation by spending his time at the summit engaged in
interactions that are dialogical, as implied by the fact that he and ffie villagers are
“giggiing and pratiling away” togeffier. 0f course, Ernie and his companions
also, through their interactions, challenge “officiai narratives” (Perera 15) of
collective identity and partition. Emie, a Burgher, speaks Sinhala; Amitha, who
“should” speak Sinhala, does not, because he is deaf; the villagers, who could be
Tamil or Sinhalese, are comfortable socializing with someone of European
descent. And Amitha’s “foui mood” is, as the text elsewhere implies, connected
to his infimate relafionship wiffi Emie, a relafionship that defies both cultural and
sexual boundanes. In short, this ethnically mixed group fails to respect the
linguislic and cultural divisions through which narratives like Kanda’s (and the
LTTE’s) insist that Sri Lanka’s ethnic communffies are fundamentally different
and incompatible.
As I suggested earlier, Kanda’s insistence on the existence of rigid,
mutually antagonislic collective identifies in Sri Lanka is problematic not only
because it denies the country’s social realifies and naturalizes intolerance but also
because it implies an abdication of moral responsibility. In his letter, Kanda
declares, “I am a Tamil. That is how I think and conduct myself” (203). His
comments suggest that he thinks and acts not as Kanda Selvarajah, an individual
with multiple concems and belongings, but as part of a collective, whose shared
ways of thinldng and behaving provide a model to which he conforms. In
Michael Ignatieff’s terms, Kanda allows himself “to be spoken for by the
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collective discourses that have taken [him] over” (99). My criticism of this
surrendenng of voice (where voice is understood in a very broad sense) is based
on an assumption, central to individualism and crucial to existentialism, that
human beings must take responsibility for the choosing of their values and
beliefs and for the consequences of those moral choices. Our moral choices are,
as I have been arguing throughout this study, made in dialogue with significant
others. But the dialogical genesis of those choices does not mean that we are
released from responsibility for them. One of the theorefical problems wiffi
conceiving of the way one thinks and acts (one’s moral constitution, in other
words) as being determined by membership in a parficular collective is that such
a conception
— not unlike a belief in fate or predestiny
— effectively denies the
individual’s responsibility for Mm- or herseif. If I believe that my ways of
thinking and acting are determined by the fact that I am, for example, French
Canadian or female or Jewish, then it is not I who am responsible for my beliefs
and behaviours but, rather, ifie collective that has shaped me.
In pradical terms, the problem with such a conception is that it faduitates
intolerance and violence. As lgnatieff argues, if peopie “canrot see themselves as
the makers of their individualities,” then it follows that “they cannot see offiers
as the makers of theirs eiffier” (99). Tolerance of others, he goes on to say,
“depends, critically, on being able to individualize oneseif and others” (100).
Other people, when understood as unindividuated components of a collective,
are not altogether human. If I perceive that certain members of that collective
are threatening to me in some way, my failure to acknowledge the individuality,
and therefore the humanity, of the collective’s other members will make it easier
for me to reciprocate the threat in a generalized manner: to teil racist jokes, to
segregate schools, to exterminate an entire population. And, of course, if I do not
conceive of myself as being personally responsible for my beliefs and my
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actions, then such practices become even easier.
Over the course of Adam ‘s Peak, certain features of the politics of collective
identity corne under the scrutiny of the novel’s central characters, particularly
those on the “Vantwest” side of the narrative. Uncle Ernie expresses
considerable sympaffiy for views and strategies such as those that Kanda
endorses; however, Emie’s sympathy is overshadowed by the attacks of other
characters. Through their conversations about Sri Lankan politics, Rudy, Alec,
and Mary — ail of whom the text treats as reasonable and reliabie (if flot
consistently iikable) — contribute to the novel’s criticisms of the collective
conception of identity.
Expressing an idea similar to one I introduced in Chapter One — that
there are circumstances in which it can be polifically useful to think of oneseif as
part of a collective and to act for the benefit of that collective — Emie Van Twest
implies that Tamil nationalism represents a necessary strategic adopting of
collective identity. With regard to Sri Lanka’s political turmoils, he hypothesizes
that “[t]hings would have been fine and dandy if [the country had] goften off on
the right foot after independence,” then he argues that, in reality, Tamils “have
been exploited and excluded, and they’ve had enough” (284). Ernie’s remarks
suggest that Tamil nationalism — and, by extension, the identity politics that
accompany it — is a product of the attempts of post-colomal, pro-Sinhalese
governments to disenfranchise Tamil people. He implies that were it not for such
moves on the part of the government, political relations in the country would 5e
“fine and dandy” — in keeping with the peaceful coexistence of everyday life —
and Tamil peopie would have no need to assert either a collective identity or a
collective difference from the rest of the country’s people. In response to Rudy’s
rhetorical query as to “just how small a group should have the right to self
government” (284), Emie acknowledges the insubstanfiality of essentialized
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collective identifies but aiso reminds Rudy of their strategic usefulness:
‘You musn’t misunderstand me, Rudy, when I speak of homeiands.
I’m not saying we should allow ail the green-eyed, English
speaking Burghers with Dutch grandfathers to declare a homeland
on the outsldrts of Colombo. As you say, it makes no sense. Ail
those things — language, race, religion and whafriot
— those are
the least interesting aspects of who we are. They’re just
circumstances. It’s what we do with our circumstances that matters.
But it’s just those sorts of meaningless circumsances that have
been used against the Tamil people. It’s a wretched bloody mess,
and I think the government should give the buggers whatever
polifical autonomy they want. Or expect to keep having their
country bombed to bits.’ (285)
Emie’s analysis of, on the one hand, the “meaninglessness” of the kinds of
features that serve to define collective identifies and, on the other, of the real
world significance of those features parallels Michael Ignafieff’s comments on
the tensions between Serbs and Croats. The differences between Serbs and
Croats, he writes, “are tiny — when seen from the outside — but from the inside
they are worth dying for because someone will kilI you for them” (96, emphasis
original). Emie Van Twest suggests, in his prediction of ongoing violence, that
the best response to chronic ethrilc tensions is polifical secession, a move which
implies the asserting of a collective ethnic idenhty. Ernie’s conclusion is similar to
ffiat of Anthony D. Smith, who argues in 17w Ethnic Origins of Nations that the de
linking of ethmcity and statehood through confederal states “must remain a
utopian dream” (225). Ulbmately, the text of Adam’s Peak does not suggest ffiat
there is an unquestionably better response to crises such as those in Sri Lanka or
the Balkans. But the novel’s other characters do reveal several serious limitations
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of the polifics of collective idenfity.
Rudy, despite his attraction to certain features of collective identifies, and
despite his persistent tendency to question his own convictions, is the text’s most
consistent critic of nafionalist idenfity politics. The question to which his uncie is
responding in the passage quoted above is, significantly, more complex than
Ernie’s comments acknowledge. After asking “just how small a group should
have the right to self-government,” Rudy pursues the matter:
‘And what’s supposed to happen to ah the non-Tamils in a so-called
Tamil homeland? Or ail the non-Francophones in an independent
Quebec? People move around and mix themselves up so much
these days. I don’t think it makes sense to define a country in terms
of things like language, or ethriic background, or.. .‘ (284-285)
From a certain perspective, it is possible to crificize Rudy’s comments as falling
into what Leela Gandhi terms the “current bias of Western anti-nationalism”
(103). Smith, who is far more critical of that perceived bias than is Gandhi, attacks
Western observers who too easily dismiss the nafionalist cai’ ses of people who
have “known exile or subjugafion of land and culture” (2). Smith’s argument is
an important one, for it is indeed far easier for someone whose ethnic identity
has neyer been insulted or attacked, someone wiffi the means to “move
around,” to view certain nationalisms — in parficuiar very small-scale ones
— as
problemafic and even poinfless. Yet Rudy’s questions, though put forth by a
relatively pnvileged “Westemer,” point to a real and ultimately unresolvable
dilemma: how to conceive of a “homeland” for a narrowly defined group of
people without suggesting that those who inhabit the land but do not fit the
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definition are not enfirely “at home”? Arguably, it is not possible. Moreover,
the dilemma is an unavoidable one. For even if we disregard the complex,
dialogical nature of human identity formation, the geographic, ethnic, and
cuitural intermingling of the world’s population lias sf11, as Rudy’s comment
about people moving around and mixing themselves up points out, made the
bracketing off of any homogeneous, monolithic chunk of humanity an
impossibility. In a nation conceived in terms of an essentialized collective
identity, in other words, there will aiways be peopie who don’t quite fit, people
whom L.C. Buchheit refers to as “frapped minorifies” (29). These are the people
to whom Rudy refers when lie asks, “what’s supposed to happen to ail the non
Tamiis in a Tamil homeland?” The question is a valid one, for it hints at the fact
that nations conceived in this way uffimately propose, explicitly or implicitly, an
ethnocultural nomi, against which cifizens might be measured and, conceivably,
found deficient
— second-class, even undesirable. b say that a parficular
territory is to be the “homeland” of Tamil people or Serbs or “pure taiiie”
Quebecers is, thus, to foster the same kind of suspicion and intolerance that
ethnically-based nationalisms often seek to escape.
In Canada, the Bloc Québecois’s awkward efforts to construct ïtself and its
proposed nation as ethnically diverse and tolerant demonstrate the tremendous difficulty of
reconciling the modem valuing of universal rights with the exclusionary ideats of ethnic
nationalism. Cautious flot to appear racist or xenophobic, yet stili committed to the ïdea of a
distinct collective ïdentity
— a “particularité identitaire” — Maria Mourani, president of
the BQ’s “Commission sur la citoyenneté” describes a sovereign Quebec as “une nation
ouverte à la diversité ethnoculturelle, en constante évolution et unie par une langue
commune: le français” (pi). This vision of an inclusive, multiethnïc society, unified by a
common language (which, for many Quebecers, is not a flrst language) is significantly
different from the more radical vision of a white, Francophone, “pure laine” society, which
has been endorsed by numerous Bloc Québecois and Parti Québecois members and
supporters over the years. The desire to assert an exclusive identity was again evident in the
BQ’s 2004 federal election campaign slogan — “Parce qu’on est différents.” But the
striking diversity of the people proclaiming the slogan on television and radio suggested
that the same words could have been used in almost any Canadian province. For instead of
asserting a collective difference from the rest of the country, the actors in the BQ
advertisements ultimately, and far more emphatically, asserted their individtial differences
from each other.
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Rudy’s query about the fate of “non-conformists” in ethnic homelands
also, of course, alludes to the problem of ethnic violence, and the way in which
collective conceptions of identity serve to efface people’s individuality and
humanity. What frequently “happens” to people when a multiplicity of
individuals is recast as a pair, or a handful, of collectives is that those individual
people become scapegoats, pawns, victims. After reading Kanda’s pro-LITE
essay, Rudy imagines asking the boy, “What if your sister gi.t in the way of a
Tiger attack, Kanda?” (50-51). Such an event does not occur in the nove!;
nevertheless, Rudy’s question foreshadows the Colombo bombing, in which, as
Alec Vantwest points out, the Tigers “ldll off even their own kind” (221). What
the indiscriminate, even self-destructive, violence of this bombing suggests is
that the individuality of the people who happen to 5e in the office building, as
well as that of the suicide bombers who carry out the deed, has been, to use
Hardt and Negri’s terms, “negated in the sfraitjacket of the identity and
homogeneity” (107) of the collective. The deaths of a few hundred individuals —
Sinhalese, Tamils, others — are, implicitly, unimportant when those individuals
are understood as reproducible components of a collective self. And, as I
suggested earlier, when the responsibility for personal idenfity is ascribed to.
abstract collectives, then it is easier, morally, to attack, to reject, to kili than it is
when one conceives of oneseif as a responsible individual, a moral agent, in
interaction with other individuals.
Through Rudy’s reaction to the victims he encounters in the aftermath of
die bombing, Adarn’s Peak challenges both the dehumanizing tendency and the
tendency to abdicate moral responsibility that accompany collective conceptions
of the self. Rudy’s impulse, on reacffing the “six or seven people lying in the
shade,” looking to him like “synthetic dummies,” is to “dismiss them altogether”
(211). This initial reaction evokes die implicit attitude of the LITE in organizing
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and execufing the attack on the downtown office building, b the Tigers, the
occupants of ffie building are, in a sense, no more human than “synthetic
dummies”; ffiey are “dismissible,” dispensable. Yet Rudy, forced into face-to-face
contact with the bomb vicfims
— he must go past them to reach the boy he
thinks is Kanda — is unable to be rnorally indifferent or to ignore tbe victims’
humanity. He sees the victims as individuals: a “pair of middle-aged
businessmen; a woman of thirty or so in a pink, bloodstained blouse; another
woman, fortyish, ber hair in a dishevelled bun” (211). The features he notices —
age, sex, occupation, clotbing, hair — are noteworthy not only for the way they
individuate (if crudely) the people, but also for their lack of explicit connection to
the collective identifies that are at stake in the Tigers’ bombing of tbe building.
Rudy does not see collective identifies — Tamil, Sinhalese, Burgher, and so forth
— in tue faces of ffie vicfims (though ethnicity could, conceivably, be one of the
features he notices); rather, he sees individuals, for whom, he concludes, “he
[bas] to 5e responsible” (211). His sense of moral responsibility for the nameless
victims cornes from his ability to exfrapolate from the individuality of his
student. “If Kanda were to 5e alive,” Rudy posits, “then these grim bodies on the
pavement had to be real” (211). In other words, if the individual life in which he
is particularly interested is to be valued and spared, then he must acknowledge
the individuality and humanity — the realness
— of the sfrangers, and he must,
implicffly, take responsibility for mouming them. This capacity on Rudy’s part to
acknowledge the individuality of offiers and to conceive of himself as a moral
agent is, the novel suggests, tragically absent in those who understand idenfity in
collective terms.
Along with Rudy, Alec Vantwest also confributes to the novel’s critique of
the polifics of collective idenfity. Alec’s attack on ethnic nafionalism is more
bifing and impatient than is Rudy’s: “I can understand these people wanting to
73
be treated properly,” he says to Clare and her mother, referring to the 1995
Quebec referendum, “but what is the sense in insisting that everyone in a
country speak the same language or have the same beliefs? If ffiat’s to 5e our
understanding of what makes a country, we should take a big knife to the world
and start liacking away. And when we’re done, make sure every man stays in
his own liftle compartment” (194). In a different vein, Alec also criticizes Œie way
in which the polifics of collective identity divert people’s attention from offier
issues and concems by conceiving of the desired nation in utopian terms. The
Tigers, he says, “carry on about their homeland as if it would 5e some kind of
paradise, and ail the troubles of the underdeveloped third world country would
magically disappear” (195). Michael Ignatieff makes a similar criticism when lie
writes that the “nafionalist dream” is a “polffics of fantasy, leading the
population away from ‘reai’ issues, like the stubbom backwardness of the south
Baikans, into dreams of national greatness” (93).
Aunty Mary, finally, offers an implicit critique of the reductiveness of
collective conceptions of the self, and of tlieir denial of the dialogical nature of
identity formation. She alludes to both of these features when she attacks wliat
she sees as Kanda’s misplaced preoccupation wiffi language and culture. In
response to Rudy’s suggestion that Kanda sees his Tamil identity — his language
and culture — as “the most important thing he is” (51), she says, “What’s most
important is our family, no? We should worry about those people, whether they
are healthy and living a good life. Language and culture will look after
themselves, isn’t it” (52). Clearly, Aunty Mary’s focus on family demonstrates
that she, too, has a somewhat limited conception of selfhood. Stiul, her own
preoccupation with family relafionships and obligations challenges Kanda’s
understanding of identity and, in doing so, serves as a reminder of what Ignatieff
cails the “multiple range of our belongings” (94). More importanfly, Aunty
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Mary’s suggestion that language and culture are contingent upon relafionships,
and not vice versa, calis to mmd a dialogical understanding of the self. For in
saying that we should “worry about” our family — in other words, devote our
attention to a certain kind of relationsbip — and that “language and culture will
look after thernselves,” she implies that it is in the context of relationships that
horizons of meaning — language, culture, and so forth — are established. This
idea contrasts with collective conceptions of the self, which imply that those
horizons are non-contingent, extemal to relationships, and that they shape
individuals’ identities, from the outside.
To this point in my argument I have focussed on the ways in which the
text of Adarn’s Peak boffi complicates and criticizes the monological conception of
identity and, more explicffly, the collective conception. Throughout this
discussion I have pointed out the novel’s tendency, through particular scenes and
characters, to endorse a dialogical understanding of the self. What remains to 5e
discussed is the novel’s more global endorsement of this understanding, which it
expresses through its principal narrative developments and its form.
The idea that idenfity is formed in dialogue with others is expressed in the
novel’s central developments: Rudy’s and Clare’s ultimate cnnsfructing of new
identities. Simply put, both characters are in the midst of identity crises at the
start of the novel, and both arrive at a new sense of self, primarily through their
relationships with Adam. Clare’s brief interaction wiffi Adam and her
subsequent responses to that interaction drive the important developments in
her character. Begmnning with their shared motorcycle ride, during which she
senses that she has left behind “the old Clare Fraser” (76), Clare cornes to
conceive of herseif as someone who is capable of taking risks — meeting new
people, explonng her sexuality, travelling. And, as I suggested earlier, her
relationship with Adam brings about a shift in her interests and values. The
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joumey on which she embarks at the end of the novel
— a journey that signais
the establishment of a new identity
— is the product of intersts and abilifies she
has discovered in dialogue with Adam. Rudy’s adopting of a new idenfity
— as a
caregiver, a supporfive brother, a user of sign language
— is, like Clare’s,
signalied by a joumey that cornes about through his reiafionship with Adam. In
deciding to retum to Canada to help care for his niece and to fry to be “a decent
brother” to Adam (83), Rudy is responding both to his sense that he lias “failed”
as a brother to Adam (317), and to Adam’s encouragement of, and modeliing of,
a certain kind of direct, inhmate family support. It is significant that boffi Rudy’s
and Clare’s deveiopments are inifiated by interactions with Adam that occur just
before the accident that leaves Adam in a coma (Clare goes on the motorcycle
ride; Rudy receives and responds to a letter from his brother). Understood
metaphoricaliy, Adam’s graduai emergence from his coma — his regaining of a
sense of self
— is connected to the graduai emergence of Rudy’s and Clare’s new
identïties. This metaphoncal reiafionship between the characters cails further
attention to the social, dialogical relahonship that exists between them.
As I proposed at the end of Chapter One of this study, certain formai
features of Adarn’s Peak also contribute to the novel’s themafic concem with the
dialogical nature of identity formation. The most important of these formai
features are point of view shifts, temporal shifts, and the incorporation into the
narrative of a variety of genres. Ail of these features can usefully be considered
through the lens of Bakhfin’s theories of dialogicai discourse in the novei.
Through its shifts in point of view, time, and place, Adarn’s Peak enacts a
textual dialogue, which parallels and caiis attention to the dialogues between
characters. First, the altemating point of view of the novel’s chapters, which
switch between Rudy’s consciousness and Ciare’s, creates an emphatic back-and
forth quality suggestive of a conversation. This “back-and-forthness” is further
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emphasized through the analepses that occur in the novel’s three “interludes”
and in Rudy’s habituai flashbacks, ail of which serve to establish a conversation
between voices of the past and those of the present. Lasfly, there is a cultural and
geographical back-and-forthness in the novei’s movement between Sri Lanka (of
which the Vantwests’ house on Morgan Road could be considered a part) and
Canada, and between Scotland and Canada. b use Bakhtin’s terms, these shifts
in voïce, time, and place confribute to the “dialogized heteroglossia” (272) of the
text. Although Adain ‘s Peak does not feature quite the sprawling “multipiicity of
social voices” (263) that Bakhtin identifies in nineteenth-century realist novels,
the psychological immediacy of the novel’s cenfral-consciousness points of view
offers an intimate and significant sense of the impact of social “links and
interrelationships” (Bakhtin 263) on characters and their identifies. The four
characters whose consciousness the narrative enters (Rudy, Clare, Alec, and
Isobel) are key participants in the three ongoing conversations
— between the
Vantwests and the Frasers, between the past and the present, and between
Canada and Sri Lanka/Scotland — that shape the novel and drive its
deveiopment. The identifies of these characters are, in very broad terms, the
products of those conversations. Ciare’s idenfity, for example, is significanfly
inftuenced by her interactions with the Vantwests; Alec’s is more a product of
relationships and interactions from his past in Sri Lanka. There are, of course,
many other dialogues going on in the novel, and the characters’ identifies are, as
I have ftïed to demonstrate, complex. What the novel’s three-part
“conversafional” structure achieves, however, is a foregrounding of the idea that
human social existence is multivocal and dialogic, and that human idenfity is
The temporal and spatial “conversations” in Adanz ‘s Peak are suggestive of
Bakhtin’s work on the Iiterary “chronotope,” the term lie uses to refer to “the intrinsic
connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in
literature” (84).
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shaped by that existence.
Another formai feature that contributes to the text’s heteroglossia is the
inclusion of a variety of different genres within the novel. Embedded in the
overail third-person, cenfral-consciousness narrative are numerous letters,
wriften in different voices (Rudy’s, Adam’s, Kanda’s, Clare’s. Cousin Archie’s),
entries from Rudy’s and Grandpa’s diaries, and an essay written by Kanda. In
Bakhtin’s terms, “these genres, as they enter the novel, bring into it their own
languages, and therefore stratify the lïnguishc unity of the novel and further
intensify its speech diversity in fresh ways” (321). Like the new voices that
emerge from shifts in point of view, time, and place, the voices that these generic
shifts infroduce serve to emphasize the multivocal and, moreover, the dialogic
nature of human existence. For not only do the inserted genres carry with them
“theïr own languages,” they are also, for the most part, dialogic in their content.
The letters and the essay, in particular, are written manifestations of ongoing
interactions between characters, while Grandpa’s diary is read aïoud to Rudy in
the context of a conversation. Even Rudy’s diary, which does not uffirnately
reach its intended audience, is directed toward a real person — Clare Fraser —
and demonstrates the ways in which Rudy’s sense of self is shaped by his
interactions with the Frasers.
In various ways, then, the formai features of Adam ‘s Peak support the
text’s themafic concem with the dialogical nature of human social existence and
identity formation. Tbrough dialogue between a range of voices and genres, the
novel implicitly challenges both the unitary, monological conception of language
(dïscussed in Chapter One)39 and the monological conception of identity. The
A full exploration ofthe ways in which Adarn’s Peak challenges the monological
conception of language is beyond the scope of this discussion. One example of this
challenge, however, is the text’sjuxtaposÏng ofa variety of forms of English: “Burgher
English,” “Tamil English,” “Scottish English,” Canadian “teenspeak,” and so forth.
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novel’s heteroglossia also, importantly, challenges the kinds of essenfializations
that accompany collective conceptions of identil:y. Bakhtin writes that in the
context of novelisfic heteroglossia, “[f]ewer and fewer neufral, hard elements
(‘rock bottom fruths’) remain that are not drawn into dialogue” (300). In other
words, in a text that sfrives to represent the diversity of voices of the social
world, totalizing assertions about life tend to 5e problematized through
dialogue. While it is certainly possible to challenge Bakhtin’s daim that “social
heteroglossia” is “the prerequisite for authenfic novelistic prose” (264), Adam’s
Peak is a novel ffiat does indeed sh-ive to include the “variety of individual
voices” (264) of which Bakhtin writes. Essenfializing statements about culture
and identity are significant examples of the kinds of totalizing assertions, or
“rock bottom truffis,” that the text draws into dialogue and, in doing so,
problemafizes. The daims about identity that Kanda makes in his letter to Rudy
are filtered over the course of the novel through a variety of belief systems —
Rudy’s, Alec’s, Emie’s, Aunty Mary’s — such that those daims gradualÏy
destabilize and lose their integrity, their totality. Similarly, Clare’s and Rudy’s
conviction that their identity can be reconstructed monologically is questioned
and destabilized over the course of the novel’s many dialogues.
Adarn’s Peak is, ultimately, a dialogically sfructured text about the dialogues
and relafionships that shape who we are. The three conceptions of idenfity that I
presented in Chapter One
— the collective, the monological, and the dialogical —
are central to the novel’s conflicts, the two most important of which involve
idenfity crises. The resolufion of those conflicts, as well as the novel’s general
problemafizing of the monological and collective conceptions of the self,
suggests that, no matter how we choose to understand ourselves as selves,
human idenfity is complex, multifaceted, and is formed in dialogue with others.
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This study, like most explorations of complex issues, has left important
matters unaddressed and has, in its aftempts to answer certain questions, raised
a number of others. I will conclude, then, wiffi a few brief comments on those
unexplored, unanswered questions that seem to me particularly compelling. My
comments will focus on three areas of investigation: the politics of collective
idenfity, the process of dialogical identity formation, and identity formation as a
guiding concept for literary crfficism.
First, tbis study begs furffier investigation into the complicated “real
world” politics of collective idenfity and secession. I have argued that the idenhty
polifics that often accompany sovereignist movements are problematic;
however, assessments of the validity of such movements must consider a much
broader range of complicated factors. In bis essay fitled “The Right to Secession:
an Antisecessionist Defence,” Daryl J. Glaser offers a compelling pragmafist
analysis of frte range of factors that advisors both to secessionists and to leaders
of existing states must take into considerafion. Glaser argues that “it is morally
coherent to oppose secession in the [former] advisory role and support it in the
[latter]” (370). He goes on to say, demonstrating a political pragmafism with
which I am sympaffiefic, that “a readiness to adjust moral advice to audiences in
this way, and on this matter, is necessary for the proper performance of the task
of promoting a genuinely democratic and just peace” (370).
Though an antisecessionist himself, Glaser makes a convincing case for
the potential advantages of political secession. “There is nothing natural or pre
given about existing state boundaries,” he points out early in bis argument, “and
if those boundaries could 5e determined democratically rather than by, say,
chance or conquest, that would be, other things Seing equal, a good thing for
democracy (371). Among the potenfial benefits of secession that Glaser mentions
are the decentralizing of power, the removal of ethnicity from the centre of
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political life, and ffie protecting of threatened cultures (376). Assuming that it is
undertaken peacefully, equitably, and in a manner that provides for the
respectful freatment of minority populations, secession is, Glaser allows, a viable
political option, and a right that must be defended by existing govemments and
their advisors.
The complications and disadvantages assodated with the exercising of this
right are, however, so numerous, in Glaser’s view, that Fie advises secessionists
“to stand and fight for desirable changes in an exisfing state rather than to
initiate the further fragmentation of the state system (378). In support of this
view, Glaser problematizes ail of the potential benefits of secession that he has
identified, poinfing out, for example, that changes such as polifical
decenfralization or ethnic homogenization tend to “foster parochialism and, by
engendering more homogeneous political units, increase pressures to conform in
ways that threaten individual liberty” (377). He also argues t}iat, in addition to
problems connected to the protection of justice and individual liberty, the
difficulty of equitably dividing resources which, under an existing state, are
shared by ail citizens should be a powerful incentive for secessionists and
governments to seek alternatives to secession. Glaser proposes a few such
alternatives, including “forms of federalism, asymmetric devolution,
consociafionalism or multiculturalism” (380).
What is striking about Glaser’s suggestions, and about most liberal
humanist “solutions” to the “problem” of secession, is the fremendous gap ffiat
seems to exist between the cool reasonableness of the theorefical solutions and
the volatile emotionalïty of the real-world problem. The pragmatism of Glaser’s
solutions is, as I said, admirable; sf11, it is possible that the best insights and
“solutions” to conflicts such as those in Sri Lanka or the Baikans are ultimately to
be found in fie real-world emotionality and complexity of fiction.
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A second area of investigation to which this study points is the dialogical
process of identity formation. I have argued throughout this study that human
identity, which I equate, following Taylor, wiffi the individual’s orientation in
moral space, is formed in dialogue with significant others. In offier words, the
choices we make about what we value, what it is good to be, take on significance
for us against horizons of meaning, which are established through our
relationships with other people and through what Taylor calis “the languages
needed for seif-definition” (Malaise 33). But how, exactly, do those moral choices
happen? What are the internai processes that lead an individual to value one
choice, or way of being, over another? And what can be said about the process
of identity formation when an individual’s sense of self is negative?
In the context of clinical and educational psychology, Fran Hagsfrom and
lames Wertsch examine the kinds of cognitive processes through which
individuals constrnct for themselves a sense of who they are in the social world,
and argue that sel$ood arises from the various “self-narratives” (163), positive
or negabve, that emerge as we consftuct meaning in dialogue wïth others.
Hagsfrom and Wertsch, whose work draws significantly on the ideas of Bakhtin
and the notion of dialogicality,4° propose that “identity is an ongoing
construction within social dynamics” (163). Shifting the focus from idenfity as a
thing to the process of idenfity formation, they go on to say that “[e]ach of us in
our socially bound interactions is continually identiting” (164, emphasis original).
This process of “identiting” involves an ongoing making and remaking of
meaning through “mastery and appropriation of changing cultural tools” (167).
“Cultural tools” include everything from words to water coolers — abstract and
concrete things that come to acquire meaning for us in particular sodocultural
4° In his book Voices ofthe MinUs A Sociocultural Approach to Mediated Action
(Harvard U?, 1991), Wertsch also draws on Charles Taylor’s ideas about indivïdtialism
and the monological conception of the self.
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contexts. According to Hagstrom and Wertsch, we acquire mastery of these tools
through our interactions with others, and the qztaÏihj of thos interactions, or the
“self-narratives” that emerge from the interactions, confributes to our sense of
what is worthwhile and valuable and what is not. An example from primary
school pedagogy is useful here: if I, in making meaning from the expression
“2+3=5,” have a sense, from my interactions with my teacher, that the meaning
of that expression is a worthwhile thing and that I am a person capable
— or,
importanfly, not
— of dealing with such meanings, then the interaction will help
to establish mathematical knowledge as a significant horizon of mearnng, against
which I can understand and define myseif.
Hagstrom and Wertsch’s conception of identity formation points to two
important implications: first, our sense of self cornes as much from others’
constructions of us as from our own, and, second, “identities can be beneficial or
5e a hindrance” (163). As professors of clinical and educafior1al psychology,
Hagstrom and Wertsch are interested in the ways in which therapists and
teachers, as significant others, might help an individual under their care to
develop a “beneficial” sense of self. As a literary crific, I find the idea that
individuals have the capacity, flirough their dialogical meaning-making, to
influence the quality of each offier’s sense of self to 5e a cornpelling hypothesis
from which to analyze character and theme in works of literature.
Given that the implications and possibilities of literature are the goveming
concem of this study, I want to conclude with some remarks on the use of
idenfity formation as a guiding critical concept. Georg Lukcs writes that the
form of the novel can be understood as “the process of the problematic
individual’s joumeying towards himself” (80). This idea that the joumey to
selfhood is a crucial feature of the novel suggests, on the ont hand, that the
classification of “Bildungsroman” can, potenfially, be applied to a much broader
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set of works than it conventionally is, and, on the other, that conceptions of
identity formation, such as those presented in this study, can usefully guide
interpretations of iiterary works.
If we accept Lukcs’s daim that “the content of the novel is the story of
the soul that goes to find itself” (89), then, perhaps, ail novels are novels of
formation and development
— Bildungsromans.41 Arguably, this label is more
useful if reserved for a limited collection of texts; however, if identity formation
— the process by which individuals corne to consfruct themselves as selves
— is
indeed central to a broad range of literary works, then further attention to that
feature and its thematic and critical implications is merited. ±kre there pattems in
the ways identity is conceived of and consfructed across the spectrum of
literature? What do these pattems reveal about the social and polifical contexts of
particular works? In what ways is “idenhty-based” crificism compatible, or
incompatible, wiffi offier critical approaches, such as feminist crfficism,
deconstrucfion, or postcolonial criticism? These questions have certainly been
approached in various ways and contexts, though not, to my knowledge, in a
mariner that explicffly freats idenfity formation as a guiding critical concept. Such
an investigation would be important and worthwhule.
For, in significant ways, modem human life is charactenzed by idenfity
crises. Charles Taylor traces our concem with selfhood to the dissolution of
traditional society’s “sacred structure” (Malaise 5); Lukcs daims that ffie novel is
“the epic of a world that lias been abandoned by God” (8$). In short, without
traditional social structures and beliefs to teil us who we are, we have turned to
ourselves and to each other for that knowledge. The three conceptions of
identity that I present in this study — the monological, the collective, and the
41 SïgnïfÏcantly, Lukàcs devotes a chapter of his book to Goethe’s Wilhelrn
Meister’s Apprenticeship (1795- 1796), a work widely acknowledged as the first
Bildungsroman.
dialogical — are, I believe, apt tools for understanding how we go about
achieving that knowledge.
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